


JPRS-USA-89-001
18 JANUARY 1989



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report




Soviet Union

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 6, June 1988

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

19980127 117



Soviet Union

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 6, June 1988

JPRS-USA-89-001

CONTENTS

24 JANUARY 1989

[The following is a translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated.]

USSR-U.S.-PRC 'Triangular' Relations	
[V.P. Lukin, A.A. Nagornyy; SSHA: EKONOMIYA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, Jun 88]	1
Domestic, Foreign Aspects of U.S. Economy [V.B. Spandaryan, V.T. Musatov; pp 14-24]	7
Report on November Session of U.S.-USSR Historians [V.M. Zubok; pp 45-53]	14
U.S. Role in Afghan Settlement [V.M. Vavilov; pp 54-58]	20
American Studies in Bulgaria [Ya. Ivanchenko, I. Nedeva; pp 59-60]	23
U.S. Election Issues [Yu.A. Ivanov; pp 64-70]	23
Book Review: 'Meeting at the Elbe' [Ye. Dolmatovskiy; pp 84-86]	28
Conference of Post-Graduate American Specialists [pp 116-119]	30
Political Views of U.S. Jews [D.Ye. Furman; pp 120-127]	33
Articles Not Translated from SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 6, June 1988	39
Publication Data	40

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 6, June 1988

USSR-U.S.-PRC 'Triangular' Relations

18030010Z Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 88 pp 3-13

[Article by Vladimir Petrovich Lukin, doctor of historical sciences and deputy chief of an administration in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Aleksandr Andreyevich Nagornyy, candidate of historical sciences and senior research worker in the United States of America and Canada Institute: "The Concept of the USSR-U.S.-PRC 'Triangle' and New Realities in World Politics"]

[Text] Generalized speculations about world politics are at present, as a rule, oriented toward a future that is already close at hand, toward a boundary between two centuries that at the same time will also be the boundary between two millennia. However, it is impossible to comprehend the future without the past, without drawing at least preliminary conclusions from the way in which the foreign policy concepts of the previous period have been combined with real practice.

One of the most notable foreign policy ideas which became significantly widespread in the second half of the sixties was the concept of a "triangle," that is, of shaping specific relations among the three major powers in the world today—the USSR, the United States, and the PRC. In that period the adherents of geopolitical concepts presented the "great strategic triangle" as a framework which would sustain international relations in the second half of the 20th century. What they meant was not simply the significance of relations among the above three states, not simply geopolitical aspects interwoven into their fabric (both the former and the latter were quite obvious), but something that brought to mind the hypothesis about the "three whales" on which the world stands (although it is true that relations among the three powers were a long way from the ideal mythological ones).

It is difficult at present to say who invented the term "triangle" to apply to the structure of links among these three great powers. With his characteristic lack of excessive modesty, H. Kissinger attributes this invention to himself (agreeing, after some hesitation, to accept his boss R. Nixon, then the U.S. President, as co-author). "Nixon was inclined to believe," H. Kissinger writes in his memoirs, "that the emergence of the 800 million Chinese from isolation would by itself remove the source of an enormous threat to peace. In my opinion a China that was active in the foreign political sphere would need a very refined diplomacy to be able to incorporate our policy in the significantly more complex context arising in this way, and in the related changes which would take place throughout the entire system of international relations. But these were differences based on the same fundamental premise: If we succeeded in developing

relations both with the USSR and the PRC simultaneously, such triangular relations would give us a great strategic opportunity in the interests of peace.¹

Let us note the cunning and peculiar way the author concludes his argument: on the one hand, a "strategic opportunity," and on the other, "the interests of peace." The strategic opportunity seemed to be quite real. At that time, Soviet-Chinese relations were bad. In this empirical way the main principle of the "triangle" was found: A geopolitical (strategic) advantage is to be won by the side capable of exerting the most effective influence on the two other sides. For this purpose it is necessary to establish with these two sides the relations of an intensive dialogue based mainly on cooperation and pressure. In other words, every decision adopted within the framework of bilateral relations should henceforth take the third side into account.

Nor did the formula of "interests of peace" lack real content. The structure of the global strategic "triangle" with active relations maintained by the United States with the PRC and the USSR, and with a structure of passive or even strained relations between the two latter countries, was a concept of peace. But it was an American peace allowing the United States to employ a cunning strategic maneuver in order to recover the "legitimate" positions which it had gradually begun to lose by virtue of a number of circumstances both objective (the changed correlation of forces) and subjective (Vietnam, domestic conflicts).

The major diplomatic actions undertaken by Nixon's administration in the spring and summer of 1972 in Beijing and Moscow were an attempt to apply the "triangular concept" to international political practice. It was an attempt that scored some important points, but which in the practice of a large-scale global diplomacy proved to be limited and incompatible with the triangular scheme. Since then, however, the "triangular" diplomacy has been recalled whenever anything of importance has happened in Soviet-American, American-Chinese, or Soviet-Chinese relations, and whenever new or warmed-up foreign policy ideas of global strategic scope have emerged.

The Soviet Approach

The evolution of an attitude to the concept and diplomatic practice of the "triangle in our country" is a special subject. On the whole, this attitude has been a negative one over the last two decades. At the conceptual level, the idea of a "triangular structure" of international diplomacy was, at the end of the sixties and in the seventies, opposed by the idea of world diplomacy, the crux of which was the confrontation between two systems (equivalent to the class struggle in the international arena). The USSR and the United States were naturally the main elements in this confrontation. Peaceful coexistence was considered one of the forms of this confrontation or class struggle (and its most acceptable form). The task consisted in achieving maximally, favorable

positions for the socialist side within the framework of this bipolar structure, and in weakening the other side correspondingly. It was intended that the goal of consolidating peace would be achieved in this way.

China's place in this concept was not clearly apparent. On the one hand, China was a socialist country, and this defined its "ideal" place in the structure described above. On the other hand, the PRC's actual foreign policy course in that period clearly did not fit into this ideal. As is well known, a sharp divergence between the ideal and reality in no way contributes to defusing political passions. Dogmatic fuel is the most effective material for keeping up a high temperature of conflict. At that point there were considerable amounts of this fuel on both sides of the Soviet-Chinese border. This same fuel nurtured Kissinger's concept of a "strategic triangle." It was based on the assumption that a long period of geopolitical tension in Soviet-Chinese relations was inevitable, and on the closely related confidence in a long-term role for the United States as an active component in the triangle.

It is interesting that as soon as the concepts and practice of domestic and foreign political realism began to gather strength in the PRC in the first half of the eighties, especially after September 1982, Washington began to increasingly complain about the United States' loss of an active regulatory role in the "triangle." These complaints became especially frequent and bitter after the changes for the better in Soviet-Chinese relations became apparent. The PRC found itself occupying the most favorable position in the structure of trilateral relations in connection with the exacerbation of Soviet-American relations in the early Reagan period. This is not at all what the fathers of "trilateral diplomacy" had counted on. This gave rise to H. Kissinger's constant lamentations about his successors not running things correctly and losing the ground which he and Nixon had gained.²

What is involved here, however, is not the evolution of American positions, but the dynamics of the Soviet standpoint. The liberation from dogmatism which began in our country after the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum is promoting the development of a new political thinking and permitting a more objective analysis of the realities and priorities of contemporary international relations. This fresh new outlook has in no way brought us closer to the concept of a global "triangle." On the contrary, the new political thinking regards as alien any absolutized geopolitical constructions, which basically represent the traditionalist's way of perceiving international relations as being founded on a balance between conflicting military power centers.³ Such a perception is one-sided and thus false and illusory, and it is increasingly obviously at odds with the new, maturing realities of the 20th century's final decades.

The world of today and especially of tomorrow is an interdependent world in which global problems are playing an ever greater connecting role, while survival is

connected not with the individual buildup of military might and the creation of rival coalitions, but with general disarmament and the creation of a system of general security and international world order aimed at overcoming the worldwide phenomena of crisis which threaten all mankind. The role of the USSR, United States, and PRC in this world order will of course be very considerable, but will not be the one assigned to them by the creators of "triangular" diplomacy. The renunciation of schemes for "triangular" maneuvering represents an individual case of the renunciation of traditional geopolitical dogma and stereotyped views of the contemporary world.

A negative attitude to various kinds of great power illusions is very typical of the new political thinking. It is typical of deeds as well as words. Recent speeches by Soviet leaders have constantly stressed that the USSR does not reduce its foreign policy to Soviet-American relations. Nor can this policy be reduced to "triangular" relations, of course. It is quite obvious that contemporary diplomacy calls for a genuinely polyphonic vision.

Answering questions from the editors of the Chinese weekly LIAOWANG, M.S. Gorbachev emphasized: "The new political thinking refutes the simple old rule that if you maintain good relations with someone, it is inevitably to someone's detriment. The present age dictates a different morality and different laws. It convincingly shows that today a long-term policy cannot be constructed at someone else's expense, and that it is necessary to seek a balance of interests together rather than against someone—that is the difficult but only sure way toward general security and equal cooperation."⁴

The "triangular" concept is based on an obsolete understanding of security, according to which it must be ensured by individual or narrow coalition efforts. Only two outlines for "triangular relations" were formulated within the framework of this understanding either a coalition of two against one, or the confrontation of two while the third maneuvers as an "equalizer." The new realities suggest that every state must be vitally interested not only in its own security but also in that of its opponents, and this objectively predetermines a decisive step beyond the framework of the above "triangular" stereotypes. Only if this happens will it be possible to eliminate the mutual fears feeding the arms race, which represents a threat to the physical existence of all peoples. Within the framework of bilateral relations this presupposes a joint search for ways of ensuring security for the sides in which weapons are kept at a minimum level, and a search for common or coinciding interests in world politics. Within the framework of trilateral relations this presupposes renunciation of the principle that poor relations between two partners are always advantageous for the third partner. In our time this is far from the case: A situation of conflict between any two major powers is inevitably reflected in the most negative manner on other major and not-so-major powers. Every year

the traditional geopolitical parameters (geographical distance, for instance) play a decreasing role. Complicated combinations based on force and geopolitics are ceasing to work, and the sooner we become aware of this, the more rapidly the decrepit illusions of "national security" will be dispelled and replaced by principles of real international security.

As contemporary international realities are reinterpreted in our country, changes are occurring in the perspectives of relations between the United States and the PRC. At certain stages these relations have given to a certain amount of guardedness on our part. This can be explained in full. Pronouncements have been made—at a very authoritative level—about the need to create an "eastern NATO" and a "united front" against the USSR. There is no point now in examining the smoke from burned-out dogmatic fuel or to try to reveal all the causes and results. However, it is well known that in politics strong words from one side always result in strong gestures by the other; words and gestures then change places and the circle of suspicion and tension turns even faster.

This circle must be stopped because it is diverting our country from the execution of truly relevant tasks. One of the foundations of the new political thinking is the principle that there is no disparity between words and deeds, theoretical principles and real policy. As far as the question under examination is concerned, this means that in both words and deeds our country is now in favor of improving American-Chinese relations and of overcoming the obstacles standing in the way of such an improvement. Here we proceed from the view that this process will be accompanied by a corresponding improvement in Soviet-Chinese and Soviet-American relations. Only then will it be a healthy and strong process. The first evidence that events might take precisely this course appeared. This would mean the destruction of the fundamental postulates of the "triangle" concept in its initial interpretation made by Kissinger.

The Chinese Approach

One of the most outstanding and significant phenomena of international life in the eighties has been the serious restructuring of the PRC's foreign policy. In concise form this restructuring process can be characterized as the subordination of foreign policy to the tasks of domestic economic development. To an unprecedented extent the PRC's foreign policy activity has become oriented toward the concrete requirements of the program of "four modernizations" which is being implemented in the country. The 12th PRC Congress not only drew a line under the era of ultra-leftist foreign policy in the seventies, but also conducted a serious reassessment of the fundamental guidelines on which China's mutual relations with leading world powers were based. The congress announced the renunciation of any strategic partnership and put forward the task of intensifying the "open door" policy in all directions.⁵

The 13th CPC Congress continued and deepened this policy. As well as repeating the thesis of an "independent and individual foreign policy," its documents singled out China's aspiration to "establish friendship and cooperation with all countries in the world."⁶ It was stated that the successes of socialist modernization in China will make a new contribution to the cause of world peace and mankind's progress, and will augment the attractive force of scientific socialism.

As we can see, what is involved is not the direct opposition of some major powers to others. On the contrary, the concept of constructive cooperation and genuine detente in the community of nations is entering currency. For all intents and purposes it is being proposed that efforts be concentrated on developing friendly relations and cooperation with as broad a range of states as possible.

Documents do not, of course, always accurately and fully reflect foreign policy activity. This does not apply in the given case, however. Analysis of the PRC's concrete actions in the international arena in recent years show a fairly high and, moreover, increasing degree of correspondence between words and deeds. China's foreign policy in the years 1981-88 has really been in increasingly sharp contrast to the geopolitical conceptions of the previous period, although there is still a certain amount of inertia on a number of issues.⁷ On the whole, however, Beijing does not give one any cause to suspect it of "strategic partnership" with the United States. In recent years the sphere of constructive mutual relations with socialist states has been expanding increasingly dynamically, there has been greater activeness in various aspects of economic cooperation with the outside world, and finally, practical attention to global problems has been unprecedentedly acute—to disarmament and development, the world economic order, and ecology.

Structural domestic economic reform calls for the creation of a peaceful environment which would make it possible to move toward considerable cuts in military expenditure. Countries must be actively involved in the world economy. This is only possible with a certain type of foreign policy—constructive and restrained [neambitsioznyy].

In accordance with these requirements, a directive has been introduced into the PRC's foreign policy doctrine calling for active stimulation of a "peaceful environment," and the concept of "the inevitability of world war" has been rejected. At present the world is increasingly being treated as multidimensional, complex, and multi-polar in China.

To a certain extent such conclusions are the result of the experience of relations with the United States and USSR which has been accumulated in past decades.

Reagan's policy of qualitative and quantitative buildup of U.S. "military might" in the first half of the eighties

has quite obviously influenced Beijing's views on "national security" issues. The Republicans' ideological dogmatism, their adherence to traditional allies and friends (including Taiwan), and their corresponding allergy to truly large-scale economic cooperation with the PRC—all this cannot but contribute to China developing a more realistic assessment of the United States as a partner.⁸ After the loud words and theoretical formulas of the Nixon and Carter administration periods, when China's economic modernization was directly linked to U.S. national security and Beijing began to have inflated expectations of American aid, the concrete practice of bilateral cooperation in subsequent years was considerably more complicated and rigorous, including both restrictions and growing contradictions.

Parallel to these processes, China developed a more realistic view of the USSR, its problems, potential, fears, and real intentions with regard to the world, the Asian-Pacific region, and China. Without this realistic view and the corresponding evolution in understanding one's own national security problems, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to imagine the cuts in defense expenditure, the numerical reduction of armed forces, and the transfer of a significant part of military production to peaceful output, all of which have taken place in the PRC in the eighties.⁹

This evolution has, of course, been promoted by the changes in the USSR since the April 1985 plenum. The spread of economic reform in the USSR, the development of the concept of new political thinking, and the steps being taken to put it into practice, especially the proposal of a concrete program for the Asian-Pacific region in Vladivostok, have contributed to the erosion of old stereotypes and have eased the process of reinterpreting the "USSR phenomenon."

The sense of the Chinese reaction to our practical foreign policy actions within the framework of the new political thinking can be reduced to the following: "Good, but we would like more." This applies both to disarmament problems and to situations of acute conflict, particularly those which the PRC lists as the "three obstacles." This is an understandable reaction. Everyone who is interested in lasting peace and in limiting the arms race wants more. The new atmosphere in the so-called "triangle," to which the PRC can make (and is making) a positive contribution, is one of the important factors facilitating progress toward translating the desire for "more" into political reality. For example, Beijing cannot help paying attention to the fact that certain Soviet proposals are not only in accordance with Chinese interests and standpoints in the disarmament sphere, but to all intents and purposes adopt and embody ideas previously formulated in the PRC (a 50-percent cut in the strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and United States, and on this basis the involvement of other nuclear powers in the disarmament process; the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons).

It would be a great oversimplification to believe that all issues and problems of Soviet-Chinese relations have disappeared and that the standpoints are becoming identical. In the Chinese press and propaganda the role of Soviet initiatives most often appear to be rather modest,

while the PRC's foreign policy toward the USSR and United States is obviously carefully measured to ensure that the PRC has bilateral cooperation with each power and its allies. Through this pragmatic attitude, so typical of our age, it is now becoming increasingly possible to see the new realities of the Chinese foreign policy course which is considerably different from the "triangular maneuvering" of the preceding period and which is primarily oriented toward constructive domestic political and economic tasks.

Having made the hard choice about what is really important for the PRC in various spheres of world politics, and above all in Soviet-American relations, this great socialist country has evidently come to the firm conclusion that under present conditions it is unacceptable to follow the classic "triangle" principle, according to which poor relations between the USSR and the United States are not in China's interests. After all, in addition to the realization that no one would be left on the sidelines in a conflict between the USSR and the United States, it has become clear that further Soviet-American confrontation is leading to an intensification of the arms race, and this is forcing China to seek an appropriate response and invest additional funds in this sphere while cutting back the nonmilitary accumulation sector. This is why there is a gradually strengthening viewpoint in the PRC which holds that detente in USSR-U.S. relations is vitally important to the PRC. This is being furthered by the growing realization that the idea of some "condominium against the PRC" is definitely an unrealistic scenario which does not correspond to the interests and intentions of either the USSR or the United States.

The American Approach

Although statements by the present administration interpret the shifts taking place in Soviet-American relations as the success of policy from a position of strength, it nonetheless presents no particular difficulty to notice that U.S. policy has undergone significant evolution over the years. Initially the aim was to break off constructive mutual relations with the USSR in virtually all spheres (including curtailment of disarmament talks, reduction in bilateral contacts, and so on). What predominates now is a recognition of the need for positive cooperation with the Soviet Union, and attempts to achieve practical results, the most important of which was the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. The models of the old policy and old political thinking are still very strong in the "American corner," of course. These include the desire to militarize outer space, the attempts to further wind up the arms race in a number of important areas, and highly contradictory behavior in regional conflicts. Nevertheless, a certain shift toward a more sober policy is indubitable.

Examining the evolution of President Reagan's policy toward the USSR, THE NEW YORK TIMES commentator D. Shieler poses eternal but unfading questions: "Do people make history, or does history make people?"

At what point does the national interest begin to take the upper hand over the President's personal views?"¹⁰

The U.S. national interest (both in the sphere of military security and in the sphere of economic stabilization) presupposes participation in the complicated work to curtail the arms race regardless of any geopolitical considerations and combinations (including "triangular" ones). The same national interest presupposes an aspiration for normal stable relations with the PRC. These objective requirements are making progress through the increasingly localized circumstances.

Certain very important new elements have also gradually crystalized in Washington's approach to the Chinese problem. The distinguishing feature of current U.S. policy toward the PRC is greater realism in understanding the possibilities and limits of American-Chinese relations. In the second half of the eighties Washington gradually came to the conclusion that it was unrealistic to hope that the PRC could be turned into an "associate member of NATO" or that some special military alliance involving China, modeled on the Atlantic Alliance and with an anti-Soviet slant, could be created in the Asian-Pacific region. The relative weight of military-political aspects in the broader context of U.S. Asian-Pacific policy has also decreased against the background of other highly complicated problems (economic difficulties, deteriorating U.S. competitiveness, the imperatives of the ecological situation, concern over the domestic political development of a number of countries in the region which are of key importance to Washington, and so on). Specifically, the new aspects can be seen in the speech on the Asian-Pacific region which G. Shultz made at Stanford University.¹¹ Primarily place here was assigned to prospects for U.S. economic cooperation with states in the region, and it was only later that issues of the military-political situation were examined. This situation was no longer interpreted within the strictly bloc-based context of bipolar confrontation.

The basic reasons for the appearance of new elements in U.S. policy toward the PRC are connected with the evaluation of changes in the latter's foreign economic relations, and specifically with changes in Soviet-Chinese relations.

Although Washington's initial reaction to these changes was an extremely nervous one, American politicians were gradually forced to reconcile themselves to the new realities. The United States began to develop a more balanced and less dramatic approach to the mutual relations forming in the U.S.-USSR-PRC "triangle" as a result of China's policy after the 12th CPC Congress.

Above all the United States is actively overcoming the illusions engendered by Kissinger's geopolitical constructions, illusions concerning the possibility of overcoming objective contradictions between the United

States and the PRC by means of skillful political maneuvering using the USSR as a "negative unifying factor." A comparison of the official Chinese and American positions shows that the two countries' assessments are considerably different on 80 percent of international problems. This analysis was conducted by representatives of the Heritage Foundation, a political science organization close to the Reagan Administration.¹² Serious contradictions were also found on many other issues (the interpretation of democratic liberties and of interference in one another's domestic affairs, the evaluation of events in Tibet, and much else).

There was also an increase in the number of difficulties in bilateral, scientific-technological, and cultural cooperation. They included the trade imbalance, mutual claims that the other partner was in an advantageous position, discriminatory restrictions on U.S. imports of goods from the PRC, and finally, the problem of Chinese specialists who did not return from training courses in the United States. The Taiwan problem continues to play a great role.

In addition, in the last 2 or 3 years the United States has begun to be more clearly aware that the proximity of the sociopolitical systems of the PRC and the USSR provides considerable potential for the positive development of relations between the two states. This became particularly obvious from 1985, when the parallels between certain important trends in the development of Soviet and Chinese society began to be increasingly apparent (despite, of course, the significant specific features connected with the immense difference between conditions in the USSR and PRC).

At the same time, U.S. ruling circles gradually gained a stronger understanding that the similar natures of the sociopolitical systems of the USSR and PRC, as well as the parallels between a number of important social processes in the two countries, do not mean at all that the character and scope of their relations will become the same as they were in the fifties. The improvement in Soviet-Chinese relations is taking place in a completely new international climate, a characteristic feature of which is the appearance of more mature and diverse forms of cooperation, including those between socialist states, forms which reject rigid formats and presuppose the consideration of national interests, and of the fairly serious and long-term differences in a number of foreign policy perspectives connected with these interests.

This means that the framework for Soviet-Chinese relations proposed by dogmatists of the "triangle" concept is too narrow for the new realities which are now developing.

All in all, it can be said that the conceptual premises on which the Chinese sector of official American policy has been based for the last 16 years are less and less in accordance with new realities, and are being placed in doubt.¹³

Under conditions where Soviet-Chinese relations are improving, the fundamental premise can now be reduced to hopes that in the near future it will be impossible to overcome the most acute foreign policy problems now dividing the USSR and PRC (the so-called "three obstacles"). Recently, however, these hopes have also been melting away to a marked extent.

Now that the PRC is in a period of rapid economic progress, the thesis that China is incapable of becoming a "third superpower" is also being viewed with great doubt.

Contrary to American strategists' expectations, the end of the war in Vietnam and the diplomatic maneuvers of the United States did not result in a long-term military-strategic "reorientation of attention" toward the north by the PRC. This is confirmed by China's growing interest in Pacific problems, by its activity in Southeast Asia, and by the continuing problems between China and its southern neighbors.

Contrary to Washington's calculations, China rejected the role it had been offered as a "technological satellite" of the United States, and is striving to diversify the sources of its foreign economic cooperation (including socialist countries).

Under the present conditions it is difficult for Washington to rely on Soviet-Chinese relations being aggravated by the expansion of American arms deliveries to the PRC. Even if these deliveries are considerably increased, they cannot make the Chinese Army dependent on the United States to any significant extent. In addition, the United States is facing problems in its relations with its traditional Asian allies because of its excessively energetic attempts to thrust military cooperation on the PRC. It is obvious that in recent times neither side has considered it possible to go beyond a very limited and strictly calculated framework in this sphere of cooperation.

As far as the hopes that the PRC's political and ideological system would degenerate [pererozhdeniye], Chinese society's present social structure, as well as the domestic political measures being implemented in China to combat the negative social consequences of economic reform, show that they are unrealizable.

American-Chinese relations are thus gradually taking on a new nature. To an increasing extent they are falling outside the global geopolitical schemes drawn up 2 decades ago, and are more and more reminiscent of bilateral relations between major great powers whose common interests and expectations are largely balanced out by contradictions and problems; relations with their own dynamics and logic of evolution, which do not fit in with the calculations of "triangular game" strategists who have attempted to turn them into a flexible, elastic, and easily manipulated lever of U.S. global strategy.

One may confidently assume that the changes taking place in the "triangle" will be long-term (although some

fluctuations and reversals cannot, of course, be ruled out), because deep objective laws are exerting an increasing strong influence on the three countries' relations.

Above all, there is a growing economic and political interdependence of the world. After all, a considerable degree of national economic autarchy has been regarded as one of the main preconditions of classic "triangular" geopolitical diplomacy. Meanwhile, all the attempts made by American ruling circles in recent decades (from Nixon and his "Independence" program up to the present administration) to give the United States back its economic hegemony, which envisages U.S. independence from the outside world and world dependence on the United States, have come to nothing. As always, running into the wind has proven to be an impossible task. At the present time there is also a sharp activation in the involvement of the national economic complexes of the USSR and PRC in the world economy. The growth of parallel processes envisages the formation of relations which are fundamentally different from the methods of classic "triangular" maneuvering.

One can also see the operation of definite laws in that the three countries have felt the ruinous effect of the arms race on their economies with particular force in the eighties. Even in the United States there is a clear intensification of symptoms showing that the limits of what is possible in building up peacetime military muscle have been reached, and that competitors have intensified their attack on the main, science-intensive bastions of American military might, largely because of inordinate expenditure on war. Politicians are increasingly leaning toward the view that excessive geopolitical involvement today will mean falling behind in the scientific-technological and "information" race tomorrow. (Meanwhile, an understanding of this truth is reflected only weakly in studies of the three countries' relations which appear in the United States, in the PRC, and indeed in the Soviet Union, where Kissinger's ideas have also had a certain amount of influence.)

Finally, topical global problems, and of course the most important of them—the reality of a nuclear threat to mankind—place very strict limitations in the way of classic maneuvering by the powers. Whatever foreign policy reversals they may experience, the giants must now move in such a way that they do not offend each other too much, because a "collision" would lead not to a triumph for the third power, but rather to unpleasant consequences for both it and all mankind.

The terms of the new political thinking can be put into practice only if they become political realities; in other words, only if they become firmly rooted in the social consciousness and social life of peoples. This is no simple process, and along the way it will be necessary to burn a considerable amount of dogmatic fuel (which, unlike some other energy sources, is far from renewable).

However, this process is clearly on the rise in the second half of the eighties.

National security problems clearly do not occupy as dramatic a place on the agenda as they did 2 or 3 decades ago. The declaration of armed forces reductions in the PRC, the withdrawal of part of the Soviet forces from the MPR, and the decision to withdraw the Soviet troop contingent from Afghanistan are both symptoms of changes and the preconditions for further progress with these changes. At the same time, a Soviet-American dialogue is also beginning, if only with great difficulty, on the sides' military-political concepts and on the creation of a denser network of confidence-building measures. Tension in American-Chinese relations decreased substantially in the seventies, especially after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam and Taiwan, although even today far from all the "i's" have been dotted.

There have also been serious psychological shifts in all three directions. Even in the relatively recent past, one side's perception of the other two was limited to the alternatives of "enemy or ally," which gave rise to strong passions, and shifts between these alternatives frequently took place in a rapid and stormy manner.

These alternatives are being displaced by the more mature and less affected concept of "partner" to an increasingly marked extent. It is a complicated matter to construct geopolitical intrigues around this concept, but it is considerably easier to build healthy good-neighborly cooperation. As a result, there are growing hopes that the classic "triangular" diplomacy, constructed along channels of interstate relations in the pre-nuclear and pre-computer age and amounting to mechanical maneuvering aimed at gaining dubious minor tactical advantages, will be replaced by growing responsibility on the part of the "triangle's" three participants both to each other and to mankind as a whole.

Footnotes

1. H. Kissinger, "White House Years," Boston-Toronto, 1974, p 164.
2. See, for example, THE WASHINGTON POST, 30 January 1983.
3. M.S. Gorbachev: "Restructuring and New Thinking for Our Country and the Whole World," Moscow 1987, pp 137-165.
4. PRAVDA, 11 January 1987.
5. All-Chinese PRC Congress. Beijing, 1982, pp 59-69.
6. RENMIN RIBAO, 4 November 1987.

7. In this respect one can turn one's attention to the traditional interpretation of the Cambodian and Afghan problems, the continued existence of the superpower thesis in current affairs writing and propaganda, and also the rhetoric of much of the analytical material published at various levels in China, which sometimes make one think that Chinese international specialists fairly often cannot keep pace with their leadership's dynamic foreign policy and are earnestly clutching at geopolitical schemes.

8. LIAOWANG, No 7, 1987, pp 30-31; No 2, 1988, pp 8-9; SHIJIE JINGJI DAOBAO 9 November 1987.

9. JINGJI RIBAO, 7 March 1987.

10. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 3 January 1988.

11. THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 15 May 1987.

12. "President's Visit to Peking," Heritage Foundation, Washington, 1984. [preceding title in English]

13. See, for example: "United States-China Relations: Today's Realities and Prospects for the Future. Hearing...U.S. Senate," Washington, 1984 [preceding title in English].

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka," "SSHA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya," 1988

Domestic, Foreign Aspects of U.S. Economy
18030010a Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 88 pp 14-24

[Article by Viktor Borisovich Spandaryan, candidate of economic sciences and acting deputy director of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, and Vladimir Tikhonovich Musatov, doctor of economic sciences and sector head at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies]

[Text] The election campaign in the United States is entering its decisive stage. The state of the nation's economy is prominent among the factors which will determine the outcome of the current battle for the right to spend 4 years in the White House. How can this role be described? There is the temptation to call it decisive; in any case, this position seems more than natural for economists. Besides this, it seems to be one of the logical implications of the fundamental philosophical concept of the connection between existence and consciousness. But in spite of its importance, "economic existence" cannot cover the growing variety of existence as such. The higher the level of prosperity, the less important the purely economic element of daily life appears to be (mainly because economic growth gives the ruling class more opportunities to influence the ideological position of the working public).

Now that the satisfaction of all of the basic needs of the overwhelming majority of the American population has been guaranteed for several decades, there are many intermediate links in the connection between "economic existence" and the decision to vote for a particular candidate. There are so many that the average voter can—and often does—lose sight of purely economic considerations. And once he loses sight of them, he also loses interest in the very procedure of elections (it is no coincidence that the percentage of the American population actually casting a ballot has been declining in the postwar period and has now dropped to about half of all eligible voters).

This does not mean that the state of the economy no longer has any effect on the outcome of elections in the United States, but, all other conditions being equal, this effect has grown weaker as the standard of living has risen and as the chance of maintaining at least its symbolic rise has increased. In fact, even a slight decrease in real income can be taken quite calmly if the point of departure is a fairly high income level.

Of course, we are oversimplifying some extremely complex issues and are taking the risk of being accused of primitive thinking, but we are doing this for only one reason: to remind the reader once again of the groundlessness of the particular variety of genuinely primitive thinking which is known as "economic determinism" and which offers an economic explanation for any sociopolitical event. Production relations constitute the foundation of the entire group of socioeconomic relations between people, but they are not reflected directly in daily social life. One of the results of this is the situation in which economic conditions do not necessarily decide the outcome of elections. What is more, today they can represent just an obscure background which is almost unnoticed by many voters, particularly in view of the excellent directorial skills of the powers that be.

Then was it worth it for the authors of this article to take up their pens? It seems to us that certain processes in the U.S. economy today could increase the significance of the "economic factor" in the periodic competition between Republicans and Democrats for the presidency. We must stress that they will not increase it in comparison with "average statistics" for recent decades or the "normal" impact of this factor, but in comparison with "peak" periods. One such period was the 1980 campaign, when Ronald Reagan specifically underscored the deterioration of economic conditions during J. Carter's term in office and the resulting urgent need for serious changes in economic policy. There is no question that these changes were made. There has even been enough time for the effects of these changes to be revealed completely. The current situation is distinguished by new and more serious economic problems than in 1980. These problems, however, are having little effect—at least at this time—on the outward appearance of the campaign; the economy seems to represent a "dark

horse" hidden behind the scenes. This is why it is particularly important to take a close look at the state of the economy after 8 years of a neoconservative administration.

Results of "Reaganomics"

Monopolist capital in the United States had high hopes for the neoconservative economic policy. The Reagan Administration must be given credit for making every effort to justify these hopes. The dilettantism and cheap sensationalism which were so noticeable in the theoretical platform of neoconservatism, especially in the pretentious writings of the heralds of so-called "supply-side economics," had little effect on actual economic policy. From the very beginning the attainment of policy objectives was controlled by prominent bourgeois leaders with sufficient experience and determination (a perfect example is P. Volcker, who headed the Federal Reserve System, the central U.S. bank, until the middle of 1987 and wielded almost uncontested authority in the business community).

Today the administration is taking credit primarily for the dramatic deceleration of the rise in prices, the lengthy period of economic growth, the creation of millions of new jobs, the related reduction of unemployment, and the growth of the income of American families. All of these points were specifically mentioned in Reagan's state of the union message to Congress in January 1988, which could not fail to display signs of campaign rhetoric.¹

Because the administration views the curbing of inflation as its first and most impressive victory in the economic sphere, we will start by taking a look at price dynamics in the 1980s. It is true that the rate of inflation is much lower (although it is also indicative that it has not disappeared completely): Whereas the consumer price index rose by more than 12 percent a year in 1979 and 1980, it rose by around 4 percent a year from 1982 through 1985, and only by 1.1 percent in 1986. In 1987 the prices of consumer goods rose by 4.4 percent,² and this must be interpreted as a result of stronger inflationary pressure, but the important thing is not only that this accelerated rise "smudges" the idyllic picture of the victory over the "inflation demon." Price dynamics cannot be examined in isolation from other indicators of the state of credit and finances.

The practice of "Reaganomics" turned out to be closely related to the growth of the federal debt and has now equated the two. In theory, however, the original draft of neoconservative economic policy did not envisage unprecedented budget deficits and even included a promise to balance the federal budget. Was this a sincere promise? Of course, the policy statements included much of the "standard bill of fare" traditionally offered to voters. Nevertheless, the neoconservatives do not appear to have had any ulterior motive in promising to balance the budget. The growth of the federal debt is

contrary to their ideas about "fiscal responsibility" and is inconsistent with their cherished ideas about the spirit of the capitalist economy of the last century. When we assess their almost immediate renunciation of their own goal of improving federal finances, we must take several facts into account.

The first—and main—consideration is that the ruling class in America today cannot avoid redistributing a growing share of national income through federal budget channels. Redistribution by direct methods, by collecting taxes on the income of the working public, has its limits and is not always acceptable for sociopolitical reasons. Deductions in the form of an income tax are too visible and tangible. Deductions in indirect forms, such as inflationary forms, however, are not only less noticeable but are also less predictable and exact than taxes. By the end of the 1970s, however, the inflationary form of indirect taxation had been virtually depleted. Inflation was branded "public enemy number one." This was no coincidence. Contemporary inflation, which is distinguished by unequal rates of increase in the prices of different groups of commodities and, consequently, by the unequal positions of various groups of producers and consumers, could be compared to a race track. The government and the giant corporations closely related to it easily reach the finish line before anyone else in the first laps. In subsequent laps, they must increase their speed to win the "prize"—i.e., to redistribute some portion of national income in their own favor. "Creeping inflation" is like a race on a level track, but when the racers speed up, they can no longer stay horizontal as they go around the track. Excessive speeds turn the race into a ride up a vertical wall. The "energy expenditures" on this kind of driving become excessive and the racers are in danger of falling backwards. The race then becomes meaningless to those whose interests it served. Besides inflation, there is only one other indirect method of redistributing national income—the growth of the federal debt, which represents nothing other than deferred taxes.

Second, the abandonment of the attempts to balance the budget seemed all the more natural after deficit financing became an essentially bipartisan policy. Congress, controlled by Democrats, could argue with the administration about the distribution of income among various budget items, but the growth of the federal debt was not repudiated (verbal assurances notwithstanding). In 1980 the total debt of the federal government (as of late September, at the end of the fiscal year) was 914 billion dollars. The doubling of the debt—to 1.827 trillion dollars—had already occurred by the end of fiscal year 1985, and at the end of September 1987 the federal debt reached 2.355 trillion dollars.

Under the conditions of "Reaganomics," budget deficits became something like a reflection of the same deep-seated problems which had manifested themselves in the form of inflation in the previous decade. For this reason, what the promoters of "Reaganomics" call the main

positive achievement of neoconservative economic policy, what they call the victory over inflation, is only an illusion. It would be wrong, however, to simply conclude that one indirect method of redistributing national income (inflation) was replaced by another (the growth of the federal debt) in the 1980s.

"Reaganomics" added a qualitatively new element to the process of redistribution by transferring it to the international level and including the resources of the entire capitalist world in the financing of American government expenditures. As a result, within just a few years the world's main creditor, which is what the United States was before Reagan entered the White House, had become its main debtor. At the end of 1986 the foreign debt of the United States was equivalent to 263.6 billion dollars.

In principle, the specific mechanisms of "living beyond one's means" can be quite varied, whether we are discussing an individual, a company, or a country: They can range from the simplest underhanded treatment of creditors to the exertion of pressure on them. The United States' ability to attract credit resources ultimately rests on its role as the economic and politico-military leader of the capitalist world, but any borrower, even the United States, eventually confronts the limits dictated by his economic potential. The greater the gap between this potential and acquired credit becomes, the more probable it is that "living beyond one's means" will lead to bankruptcy or, in the case of a country, to economic upheavals of varying dimensions.

According to estimates in the American commercial press, because of the administration's strategic line, which could be described as adherence to the elementary premise "buy now, pay later," the standard of living in the United States is now financed by foreign creditors by almost 4 percent.³ This strategy has allowed the administration to increase federal expenditures for several years, primarily for military purposes, contrary to campaign promises. But the limits of this strategy are already quite distinct.

Therefore, the attraction of funds from abroad as a method of compensating for the deceleration of inflation and, to some extent, for the growth of the domestic government debt (without this, it would have grown even more), had been exhausted by the beginning of the current campaign and had created the problem of deciding how creditors could be repaid without lowering the standard of living and disrupting the mechanism for the redistribution of national income. When the problem is stated in these terms, it is clear that there is no possible solution. In all probability, the American working public will have to pay for the economic "success" of the neoconservatives with a lower standard of living. The form of payment is most likely to be inflation, and the entire cycle will start over. Does this mean that the neoconservatives simply ignored the fact that the federal

debt was nothing more than an alternative to inflation and that the victory over inflation, achieved through the growth of this debt, was not a victory at all?

To some extent, the neoconservatives were probably trying to pass off dreams as realities, but it obviously would be wrong to deny that they pursued the interests of their own class by striving for genuine advancement in the resolution of economic problems. There is no question that the stakes were quite high and that they took a risk, but they were not simply chasing illusions. The stakes were economic prosperity, the growth of new industries, and the consequent enhancement of the competitive potential of American goods in world markets.

Let us take a look at this aspect of "Reaganomics." In the cycle which began with the crisis of 1980-1982, the period of economic prosperity was one of the lengthiest in American history. The Republicans tried to take advantage of this fact in their election campaign, but, in the first place, "lengthy" is not the same as "intensive." The very fact that the rate of GNP growth in the 1980s was lower than in the 1970s is indicative. In the second place, the period of prosperity was primarily a result of cyclical forces, while the administration's economic policy was only a secondary factor. For this reason, we should determine the objective content and exact "price" of this economic growth and the degree to which it was influenced by government actions.

The most prominent of the deep-seated processes affecting the development of the American economy since the beginning of the 1980s was the start of a new phase of the technological revolution and the consequent appearance and stepped-up growth of new areas of production. American corporations have always made every effort to take the lead in advanced sectors. The new phase of the technological revolution was directly connected with the powerful wave of mergers and takeovers in the American economy in the 1980s. The regrouping of forces and the penetration of spheres new to corporations required colossal expenditures and increased their debts substantially. In addition, the purchase and sale of companies led to widespread speculation.

Of course, the reorganization of the production system with the aid of the latest scientific and technical achievements and the more intense U.S. participation in international division of labor were objective processes stimulating the development of the American economy, but we should not lose sight of the fact that similar processes, and more intensive ones in many cases, are occurring in other industrially developed capitalist countries and that the United States is not the leader in this sphere. Furthermore, the United States is lagging behind OECD countries in labor productivity growth, in accumulations, and in several other areas on which the long-range prospects for economic development depend.

According to plans, the technical reorganization the corporations accomplished during the period of prosperity was supposed to solve fundamental structural problems in the American economy. If this had been the case, "Reaganomics" probably could have been congratulated on an important victory. The neoconservatives, however, avoided participating in the resolution of structural problems. They categorically refused to pursue the industrial policy that so many respected American economists and businessmen spoke of as absolutely essential. A centralized industrial policy was inconsistent with the psychological climate in which the spirit of absolutely free enterprise became dominant. Of course, there is no guarantee that an industrial policy would have attained the goals its fans had declared, but it is probably that the resulting situation would have been better than the current one.

The competitive potential of American goods in world markets reflects the success in retooling and economic growth. A survey conducted in 1987 by the HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW reveals some indicative assessments of the competitive potential of American products by members of the business community (American and foreign). Around 4,000 readers answered a questionnaire sent out by the magazine. Around 92 percent of them felt that the competitive potential of American industry was declining; 87 percent expressed the opinion that the problem of competitive potential arose even before American exports had been "tripped up" by the high exchange rate of the dollar in the beginning of the 1980s; 95 percent believed that low competitive potential would remain a problem for the United States in the foreseeable future; 89 percent thought that this problem would have an adverse effect on the standard of living in the United States and on America's economic strength.⁴

As we can see, the neoconservatives' attempt to take credit for the economic growth was futile: Growth is growth, but the American economy's main problem was not solved. On the contrary, the high dollar exchange rate pursued by the United States prior to 1985 was essentially a gift presented to the American corporations' foreign competitors. It became much easier for imported goods to penetrate the U.S. market.

We should also remember that American corporations were preoccupied at that time with the abovementioned process of mergers and takeovers. This naturally halted the enhancement of the competitive potential of American products. Economic growth continued primarily as a result of active consumer demand, stimulated by the influx of cheap goods from overseas and the growth of consumer credit.

Does this not testify to the validity of at least the neoconservatives' statements about the increasing prosperity of American families during the years of "Reaganomics"? There was no outright deceit in this case: As far as family income and per capita income are concerned, there was obvious growth. For example, real

(adjusted for inflation) per capita income increased by around 35 percent between 1970 and 1986. If this is true, then why have most of the Americans polled in recent years invariably said that they are in a worse financial position than before or that their financial situation has not changed at all? The solution to this paradox is provided in a report prepared by the Congressional Research Service on the dynamics of real income since 1970. The final conclusion in the report is that the main indicators of the standard of living are either the same as they were then or are lower than they were. In 1986, for example, the average hourly wage of workers in American industry was 10 percent below the figure in 1973, when it reached its maximum.⁵ There are two explanations for the growth the neoconservatives have pointed to in "average statistical" per capita income: First of all, there are more workers in families—a single breadwinner cannot earn enough; second, there has been a slight rise in income not connected with the labor of the recipient, primarily in interest on securities, including government bonds. In the final analysis, the foreign resources used for the financing of budget deficits covered part of these payments. This is one of the specific methods of the abovementioned subsidization of the American standard of living by foreigners.

Estimates of the number of jobs created in the 1980s also vary. In December 1987 the rate of unemployment dropped to 5.8 percent, the lowest indicator of the last 10 years.⁶ Nevertheless, the neoconservatives cannot take full credit for this. It is significant that during the phase of prosperity the rate of unemployment remained higher than it had been in the years following the crisis of 1974-1975. Unemployment did decline slightly during the ascending phase of the current cycle, but most of the new jobs created during the period of prosperity were in the service sphere, while the number of people employed in industry decreased. It would be difficult to call the growth of the service sphere at the expense of the competitive potential of American industry a positive tendency.

There is one item on "Reaganomics" list of assignments that can rightfully be stamped "completed." This is the reduction of taxes. The neoconservatives gradually began working toward their key policy objective as soon as they took office, without procrastinating and with great zeal. It is true that the reduction of taxes did not produce the anticipated results. Above all, it did not stimulate investment: The extra funds remaining at the disposal of corporations and large property owners were not used in the financing of capital investments, but in operations with securities, most of them speculative. The tax reform had a greater impact on the federal debt, because the reduction of budget revenues caused the growth of this debt.

The exacerbation of credit and financial problems and the maintenance of a high "double deficit"—in the federal budget and the balance of trade—undermined the trust of financial markets in "Reaganomics" and led to

the most intense stock exchange panic in all of U.S. history on 19 October 1987. Did it hand down the final verdict on "Reaganomics"? Yes, in a certain sense it did, but the situation was not that simple.

Economics and Elections

In 1988 the Republicans would like to use the economy as one of their main trump cards, just as they did in 1984. At that time the cyclical phase of prosperity unwittingly performed a great service for Ronald Reagan and contributed much to his re-election. It would seem that the stock market crash would have changed the situation radically and deprived the Republican Party of many of its winning arguments. The next economic crisis, however, did not begin at the same time as the upheavals in the stock market and could start after the elections. In any case, the administration is doing everything within its power to delay the crisis. Anti-crisis measures could become the main consideration in 1988, representing a new reversal in neoconservative economic policy.

During the crisis of 1980-1982 the administration took the position of an innocent bystander, giving cyclical forces a chance to "do their work," and did not become involved until the middle of 1982, when it was time to take stimulating measures. In 1988 the neoconservatives have departed from their original position, consisting in giving market forces maximum free play, in anti-crisis policy as well. The postponement of the next crisis is their main goal. There are signs of declining economic indicators: The situation with regard to housing construction is not good, consumer demand has begun to decrease (since the fourth quarter of 1987), and almost all of the increase in the GNP in the fourth quarter of last year was the result of increased stocks (in other words, enterprises were working "for the warehouse"). In this kind of situation the main goal of economic policy is to keep the credit and financial sphere under control and prevent new serious upheavals. To this end, the Federal Reserve System is trying to maintain the current relatively low level of interest rates. Of course, this could give rise to more serious problems in the future, but people obviously prefer not to think about them in an election year.

Farsighted politicians, however, must realize that the party in power after the 1988 elections will have to assume all of the responsibility for the effects of "Reaganomics." If the economic situation should deteriorate, the average voter is unlikely to dig for the deep-seated causes and will most probably associate economic problems with the performance of the administration in office.

"Reaganomics" was full of paradoxes from the very beginning, but it is possible that the main paradox is still to come: It is possible that many Americans will remember the middle of the 1980s as a period of relative well-being, if not as an age of prosperity.

All of this provides us with an overview of the economy's influence in the election campaign. First of all, the Democrats are incapable of launching a full-scale attack on "Reaganomics" because the period of economic growth might be coming to an end but it has not ended yet. Second, the Democrats must realize that winning the race for the White House (however dubious this victory might seem now) will force them to make difficult and unpopular decisions. The main one will concern the acknowledgement of the urgent need to raise taxes. Very little (if anything at all) is being said about this in campaign speeches, but American economists agree that this is unavoidable. It is quite logical to assume that the potentially strongest candidates from the Democratic Party might prefer to wait out this situation. Is this the reason that the list of presidential candidates does not include such famous names as Senator B. Bradley or New York State Governor M. Cuomo? In any case, the opinion of former Vice-President W. Mondale, the Democratic nominee for the presidency in 1984, probably warrants consideration: "I do not think that the economy will help the Democratic Party this year (1988—Author)."⁷

Does this mean that the economy has already decided the outcome of the election race? Not at all. Let us take a look at forecasts of GNP dynamics in 1988. The administration's optimism is quite understandable, but its predictions have not always come true. The average estimated increase in GNP in the forecasts of authoritative economists and research organizations is 1.8 percent.⁸ The very fact that the deceleration of GNP growth rates is being forecasted is indicative (and several forecasts have even predicted the absolute reduction of the GNP in 1988, although these forecasts are in the minority).

The research institute of the largest monopoly in Japan, Mitsubishi (forecasts of American economic development are of primary significance to Japanese business), assesses U.S. economic prospects in 1988 as "very bad" and does not exclude the possibility of GNP reduction.⁹ Just recently, virtually all forecasts predicted that a recession would start after the presidential elections, and a few assumed it would start in the early 1990's. Revised forecasts, however, acknowledge the possibility of an economic recession before the elections—that is, in 1988. This would create a new political situation in the United States.

In any case, the Reagan Administration's possibilities for economic maneuvers have been reduced dramatically. The colossal budget deficit prevents the active use of fiscal budget policy (tax cuts and increased government spending) to sustain economic growth. The possible consequences of the stimulation of economic activity by means of credit and finances (the manipulation of interest rates and the regulation of the total amount of money in circulation) are also quite contradictory. Raising interest rates would attract foreign capital but would also raise the price of credit and discourage economic activity. Lowering these rates, on the other hand, would cause the exchange rate of the dollar to decline even more and would reinforce inflationary tendencies.

Now that consumer demand has ceased to stimulate economic growth, the administration is hoping for an export and investment boom, but this means that the prospects for economic development are connected with conditions in foreign economic relations. This is a new situation for the United States.

So far the United States has chosen to lower interest rates in the hope of preventing the further spread of financial panic, but this is also lowering the exchange rate of the dollar and is exacerbating relations with allies by complicating their position in world markets.

Leadership as an Economic Reserve

Throughout the 1980s the United States has tried to impose—and with some success—a model of economic development in the U.S. interest on the capitalist world. During the first half of this decade a high dollar exchange rate and high interest rates were convenient for the United States (this attracted foreign capital for the financing of budget deficits and the domestic investment requirements of the business community). Now it is more convenient for America to have a low dollar exchange rate and relatively low interest rates (to expand exports and limit imports of goods and services). The United States still needs foreign capital, but now it is trying to attract it not by raising interest rates at home but by lowering them in the FRG and Japan. The United States is also demanding that these countries reduce exports and stimulate domestic demand. It is justified to some extent in making these demands on a few countries whose current development is relatively dynamic—Japan, Great Britain, and Canada. As for other U.S. trade partners, both developed and developing countries, their potential as far as the export expansion of American corporations is concerned is quite limited.

The expectation that a "weak" dollar would reduce the deficit in the U.S. balance of trade considerably has not been justified yet. It is possible that the United States will be able to reduce its negative balance slightly in the next few years by continuing to devalue the dollar, but this would have several negative effects on the American economy.

The fact is that the decline of the dollar exchange rate does not automatically increase exports and reduce imports. The competitive potential of American goods in the domestic market and in foreign markets depends on more than just prices, especially in view of the fact that the United States' main trade partners are not raising their export prices or tying their national currencies to the dollar. They want to hold on to their share of the important American market. Even if the further decline of the dollar exchange rate should reduce imports, however, this will escalate inflation, because many American producers will raise their prices (in fact, this is already happening). Besides this, the "weak" dollar gives them less incentive to enhance production efficiency. In other words, it does not contribute to the enhancement of the

competitive potential of American goods, which depends more on labor productivity than on the dollar exchange rate over the long range. The continued devaluation of the dollar could reduce the deficit in the balance of trade, but it will also have a negative effect on the American people's standard of living.

The uncontrollable decline of the dollar is undermining international trust in the American currency, and this will have negative economic and political effects on the United States. The uncontrolled "free" decline of the dollar exchange rate could cause a financial panic of global dimensions with unpredictable consequences. It is not surprising that the decline of the dollar and the increasing U.S. foreign debt combined with a "double deficit" have been blamed for the United States' loss of its previous role as the undisputed leader of the Western world in recent years. Relations with allies have been aggravated. They are objecting more and more to the difficulties entailed in the export of their products to the American market, particularly now that the United States is openly limiting imports, using several protectionist measures or the threat of their use in addition to the dollar. The anticipated decline of consumer and investment demand in 1988 will also reduce U.S. imports of foreign goods.

The peculiarities of the present situation, which are having a strong effect on U.S. relations with ally-rivals, are the result of several specific factors. First of all, there is no serious contender for the role of leader of the capitalist world. Second, the United States and its partners are so interdependent that neither the EEC nor Japan could allow the quick and severe decline of the U.S. economy without taking the risk of a global economic depression, the disintegration of the international financial system, and the collapse of world trade. Third, American capitalism still has significant reserves, particularly the incorporation of the latest scientific and technical achievements, the reinforcement of the role of TNC's (the "second economy"), monetary leverage, the tremendous appeal of its commodity and capital markets, etc.

Under these conditions, the United States will continue to take the initiative in the resolution of the main world economic problems. Its partners will have to seek compromises and make concessions. The effectiveness of collective decisionmaking, however, is diminished by the small group of countries involved—seven, five, or even three of the leading capitalist powers—without consideration for the interests of other capitalist states, not to mention the socialist and developing countries.

It is from this standpoint that the prospects for the coordination of the economic policies of leading Western countries should be viewed. The degree of coordination will depend on the future development of the world economic situation. If it should deteriorate seriously, the

instinct for self-preservation will cause the main capitalist countries to coordinate their financial, economic, and trade policies more closely, because all of them believe that a repetition of the "great depression" of 1929-1933 would be unendurable.

If no serious deterioration occurs, they will continue trying to put the burden of economic troubles on each other's shoulders, and conflicts between them will grow more acute. We can expect the United States' partners, especially the FRG and Japan, to resist the policy of transferring difficulties in the American economy to their shoulders and to increase their accumulations, intensify their export expansion, and limit their imports. This could exacerbate inter-imperialist conflicts and cause the stagnation of the world capitalist economy.

It is also possible that U.S. ruling circles will choose not to coordinate actions but to take unilateral actions dictated only by American economic interests, as they have several times in the past. This could be called the "fait accompli policy." It is probably no coincidence that influential economist M. Feldstein, former chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, advised the United States to "stop the international coordination of macroeconomic policy in a friendly but firm manner." The reason he gave was the need to convince the American business community and public that the United States is not a hostage of foreign economic policy and that it is "the master of its own economic destiny."¹⁰ It is hardly likely that U.S. ruling circles will make this extremely dangerous choice. This is more of a threat, and it is designed to make Western partners more tractable.

In any case, serious economic upheavals in the United States will exacerbate the global problems the world community is facing today. This, in turn, could have serious political, social, and economic effects on the development of world economic ties and international trade.

"Reaganomics" will come to an end twice: once when the current administration's term is over and once again when the problems engendered by neoconservative economic policy make its continued pursuit impossible and plunge America into a recession. Which event will occur first? There is probably no clear-cut answer to this question. As we have tried to demonstrate, it is possible that the period of economic growth could continue up to the end of 1988 or that a crisis could break out before the presidential elections. Furthermore, we can confidently say, first of all, that a recession, even a severe one, will not stop the tendencies witnessed in the American economy in connection with the beginning of a new phase of the technological revolution and the resulting transfer to a new technological order and, second, that the economic situation in the United States could undergo unforeseen reversals because of the extremely high level of uncertainty. For this reason, the economy is probably the main unknown quantity in the current election race. Its influence could be quite strong. Third, in any case,

the legacy of "Reaganomics" will have a strong effect on the administration that takes office in January 1989, severely limiting its choice of an economic policy.

Footnotes

1. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 26 January 1988.
2. Ibid., 21 January 1988.
3. HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, July-August 1987, p 107.
4. Ibid., September-October 1987, p 8.
5. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 30 January 1988.
6. USA TODAY, 11 January 1988.
7. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 19 January 1988.
8. BUSINESS WEEK, 28 December 1987, p 47.
9. TIME, 21 December 1987, p 35.
10. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 9 November 1987.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988

Report on November Session of U.S.-USSR Historians

18030010b Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 88 pp 45-53

[Report by Vladislav Martinovich Zubok, candidate of historical sciences and researcher at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, on meeting of Soviet-American textbook commission in Wisconsin on 8-12 November 1987: "Surmounting Stereotypes"]

[Text] Few people know that the summit meeting in Washington and the signing of the historic agreement on the elimination of two classes of missiles in the United States were preceded by another noteworthy event of considerable importance in connection with the present way of thinking.

"History Teaches Us..."

A Soviet-American commission whose duties include the exchange of reviews and recommendations on the teaching of USSR history in American schools and instruction in U.S. history in Soviet secondary schools met for the first time in 7 years on 8-12 November 1987. The official goal of our meeting was declared to be the continuation of the practice which had been interrupted by the years of confrontation and by the American side's suspension of the agreement on cultural, technical, and educational

exchanges. The agreements General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev and President R. Reagan reached in Geneva breathed new life into an important cooperative textbook project. The coordinator on the Soviet side will be the RSFSR Ministry of Education and the American sponsors will be the American Council on the Social Sciences, the Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, the U.S. Information Agency, Indiana State University, and the Johnson Charitable Trust. What will the project entail?

"History is a cat on a leash." The author of this ironic statement, renowned American historian C. Beard, had every reason to say this. Even in his time, in the 1920s, there were too many cases of the concealment or exaggeration of past events for the benefit of the powers that be and of class, nationalist, or other interests. But just think of what came later! Historical truth and objective analysis were sacrificed to the obsession with dividing our single world into two—the "free world" and the world behind the "iron curtain." The history of our country after 1917 was taught in fragments, and only to illustrate the thesis of the existence of a "totalitarian regime" and to put our state in the same category as the fascist regimes in Germany and Italy. The history of Soviet-American cooperation during the years of struggle in the anti-Hitler coalition was ignored, and any mention of the suffering and heroism of the Soviet people in World War II became "inconvenient."

Of course, the Soviet side was not completely innocent either. There was no objective and impartial presentation of U.S. history in our textbooks either. And this was not simply a matter of "cold war." It is no secret that whole schools and branches of science and culture were subjected to monstrous devastation in the 1930s and 1940s. If all history was reduced to a confirmation of the statements in the "Short Course," how high could the level of school textbooks have been? Self-glorification flourished: Tsarist Russia was the birthplace of all the great inventions and discoveries of the 18th and 19th centuries, and the Soviet Union was portrayed as a finished model of the future society, a state devoid of flaws and conflicts. The role of other countries was denigrated. There was also another reason for the lack of objectivity: Our approach to the history of Western societies presupposed a preoccupation with "constantly mounting" class struggle and signs of crisis. This led to a situation in which factors contributing to the stabilization of Western societies were either denied or underestimated; the movements of the middle strata were often given a uniform interpretation as reactionary movements.

Even our VUZ textbooks on the history of the United States, and not only school textbooks, were compiled largely as illustrations of the theses of the relative and absolute impoverishment of the working class, of imperialism as decayed and dying capitalism, of its inherent military expansion.... I am not rebuking the authors of those old books (one was my grandfather, L.I. Zubok). They were "victims of their era." They could only write

about bourgeois democracy in pejorative terms, and they had to view any society only from the standpoint of the struggle between classes, whether it was between slaves and slaveholders or between workers and capitalists, as if no other groups or strata existed in the society. It was as if the United States had not been an agricultural society for a long time, as if there had been no "Jeffersonian democracy," no "Jacksonian democracy," no populist and "progressivist" movements in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, no powerful upsurge of general democratic forces in the 1960s, no woman's movement, no consumer rights movement, no civil rights movement, etc.

For the sake of fairness, I must say that instruction in the "other" history is improving in the USSR and in the United States.

The Soviet Union has a new generation of textbooks. Our society is facing the tragic episodes in our history and reassessing our attitude toward the outside world, including the United States. This was the reason for the Soviet side's self-criticism and constructive position at the meeting with our American colleagues; in their words, this approach did much to create a favorable atmosphere for the commission's work.

We met in the headquarters of the Johnson foundation in Wingspread (Wisconsin). This extraordinary building was designed by American architect F. Wright. It is as if he wanted to show future generations that an architectural masterpiece never becomes dated and can even affect people's tastes and ideas about comfort for generations in advance!

The members of the textbook commission who met in this historic building combining the past with the present were quite aware that the discussion within its walls would determine the way in which future generations of American and Soviet youth will see the Soviet Union and the United States.

Soviet historians G.N. Sevostyanov (World History Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences) and A.N. Sakharov (USSR History Institute) directed attention to something odd: Although many foreign researchers, including Americans, renounced several distorted and oversimplified allegations with regard to our history long ago, the authors of textbooks in the United States have not followed their example. Young people are still being taught that "the Varangians laid the bases of the government and economy" in Kievan Rus, that Napoleon's defeat in 1812 was due solely to "the cold Russian winter," that the Bolshevik Party was a "totalitarian organization" from the very beginning, created by V.I. Lenin for the establishment of a "one-party dictatorship" in Russia, that the "cold war" started because of "Soviet expansion".... These statements can be found even in the latest editions of textbooks!

The head of the American delegation, Indiana University Professor G. Melenger, and other American historians and

geographers at the meeting admitted that these remarks were correct in general. The problem is, they explained, that there is an objective lag between the information in textbooks and the level of knowledge reached by professional researchers and the academic community as a whole. Speakers also blamed this on the decentralized publishing industry in the United States, including textbook publishers, and on the fact that publishers and authors of textbooks have to consider the wishes of various "pressure groups." For example, organized groups of religious fundamentalists and emigres from Eastern Europe have prevented all efforts in recent years to "neutralize" the harsh tone used in teaching aids to describe the Soviet order and the foreign policy of the USSR. If a publisher or author refuses to make outright anti-Soviet remarks, he runs the risk of being labeled a "communist sympathizer."

Is this gap between science and the statements in textbooks an insurmountable obstacle? Yes, the Americans said, but please consider the fact that the Soviet system of education, with its centralized and unified publishing industry, can make the necessary changes more quickly and more easily than the American system.

Of course, we were particularly disturbed by the mention of the "pressure groups." Will American publishers be able to withstand this pressure, and will they even want to portray our history objectively? We have two reasons for hoping that this can be done.

First of all, publishers, instructors, and historians in the United States are more concerned today about the current level of public beliefs about the Soviet Union and our history. The anti-Soviet "totalitarian school," we were told, is less and less likely to impress instructors and researchers because it complicates the understanding of Soviet society and stifles interest in the culture of the peoples of the USSR, especially the great Russian culture.

It is no coincidence that young experts on Russian history are less and less likely to delve into the "Stalinist purges" and more likely to take an interest in little-researched aspects of the folk culture, everyday life, and religion in Russia, and in the history of the gentry or the Russian "middle class," which was essentially just learning to stand on its own feet after the abolition of serfdom.... Anthologies on culture, including literature, are now being compiled for educators. Here, for example, is a list of recommended literature for American schoolteachers:

Pre-revolutionary literature: A.P. Chekhov, A.S. Pushkin, L.N. Tolstoy, and I.S. Turgenev;

Literature of the Soviet period: I. Babel ("Red Cavalry" and the short stories), F. Gladkov ("Cement"), M. Zoshchenko's short stories, Ye. Zamyatin ("We"), Yu. Trifonov ("Another Life" and "The House on the Embankment"), V. Shalamov ("Graphite" and "Kolyma Tales"),

A. Solzhenitsyn ("One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich," "The Gulag Archipelago," and "The First Circle"), and works by G. Vladimov and V. Voynovich.

As we can see, contemporary Soviet literature is represented largely by emigrant authors. Anthologies still do not contain any of the works published in the most recent years, after the onset of glasnost.

There is less tolerance for mediocre and superficial teaching aids on the Soviet Union. Describing one such book, an American reviewer quoted the following pearls, and not without sarcasm, from it: In a discussion of "Russian customs," the author describes one in detail. The people here are inclined to "embrace each other when they meet and to slap one another on the back rhythmically after a formal introduction." Publishers and educators are starting to appreciate editions in which the Soviet point of view is presented along with the American one.

The discussion led to the concrete proposal that teaching aids for Soviet and American teachers, consisting of chapters written by authors from both countries, be published jointly. American historians could, for example, describe their country's revolution, civil war, and participation in World War II, and our historians could write about Great October, the Soviet people's role in the great victory, and Soviet-American scientific and cultural ties. Corresponding Member of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences V.K. Furayev also proposed the joint compilation of a book on the interaction of the two cultures, American and Russian. The idea aroused considerable interest, including the interest of one of the largest textbook publishers in the United States—Scott Foresman & Co.

The second promising sign was the reaction of the Americans to the statements by Soviet geographers and historians at the meeting in Wingspread. Whereas the Americans once conversed with people who would not tolerate any criticism and went to great lengths to "defend our victory" and "present a crushing rebuttal," even in cases involving the most elementary conscientiousness in the search for scientific facts, now they see us quite differently. The new atmosphere in our society, which has removed the need for absolute conformity in the sciences, was perceptible during the dialogue. Furthermore, the Americans listened with great interest to our statements, however hypothetical they may have been, about the future restructuring of the Soviet science of history. What is more, most of the people at the meeting had never known, for example, of the degree to which serious problems in U.S. sociopolitical affairs are studied by researchers from the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Several American participants said that the achievements of Soviet research in American studies should be brought to the attention of as many Americans as possible—educators, publishers, and historians.

There was another wish we heard many Americans express while we were in the United States. It concerns the historical archives. Arranging for their declassification and allowing foreign researchers access to the archives will not be a simple matter, but without this we cannot completely eliminate the stereotypical view of our society as some kind of impenetrable "black box" posing threats of various kinds to its neighbors.

Commission members agreed on two important matters connected with the contents of future textbooks. First of all, there should be no "gaps" or biased accounts of events in the "other" history. Second, prejudiced accounts, embellished with ideological enmity, will be impermissible.

What are the "gaps" in the Soviet version of U.S. history in the schools?

The Americans are particularly irritated, for example, by the absence of any mention in our textbooks of the American Relief Administration's activity in Russia from 1921 to 1923. After all, it is no secret that during the years of the terrible famine, this organization, headed by future President of the United States H. Hoover, spent 136.7 million gold rubles on food, medicine, and other emergency supplies. Whatever the motives of Hoover and his colleagues might have been, the fact that the assistance was rendered is one of the positive elements in the history of our relationship. In addition, we were constantly asked why there is never any mention of the assistance the USSR received during World War II as part of the American lend-lease program. Finally, they asked us why Soviet textbooks say almost nothing about the United States' contribution to the victory over Japan or the huge battles in the Pacific—the battle of Midway, the battle for Leyte Gulf, and others.

Our historians acknowledged the validity of these comments. Some of these "gaps" will be plugged up in the textbook on modern and contemporary history to be published in 1988. Cases of Soviet-American cooperation will be discussed, and acute political crises will not be ignored. For example, the Caribbean crisis of 1962 will be discussed without the earlier omissions. I am referring to the fact that the aggravation of USSR-U.S. relations was preceded by the Soviet leadership's decision to deploy medium-range missiles in Cuba....

One of the authors of the new textbook, V.K. Furayev, said that it would (particularly in later revised editions) present a more complete description of the contribution of American science, technology, and culture to world civilization. The positive features of American life and the high level of financial well-being in the American society will not be ignored. The wishes of our American colleagues and their statements about inaccuracies will certainly be taken into account in future efforts to improve textbooks.

At the meetings of the commission, at meetings with publishers and educators in the offices of the large textbook publishing firm, Scott Foresman & Co., and at meetings in the Council on the Social Sciences in Dallas, the Soviet delegation pointed out some of the omissions and errors which obscure our history in American textbooks. The Americans responded with self-criticism, for example, to questions about the disgraceful references in several recent teaching aids and textbooks to V.I. Lenin as Nikolay Lenin. "Just imagine," Melenger said to the teachers, "if our founding fathers were to be called Tom Washington and Michael Jefferson in the Soviet Union. This kind of carelessness is an insult to the Soviet people and to the memory of the founder of their state."

Neither side tried to gloss over differences in approaches or differences of opinion. There are indisputable and understandable differences between methodological principles in the United States and the USSR. It is quite amazing, however, how extensive and productive our cooperation can be and how many inaccuracies in theories and interpretations can be cleared up without "undermining the foundation" of the two different methodologies. In the final analysis, all of the emotions aroused by the commission's work boiled down to an appeal to stop the vulgar ideologization of history and give up the practice of selecting formally accurate but somehow unreservedly negative facts of life in the other society. Soviet textbooks, for instance, mention cases of racial discrimination and segregation in the United States, but how can they ignore the efforts of the best and healthiest forces in American society to surmount these shameful practices? In the same way, American textbooks quite justifiably report our tragedies and the crimes committed in the 1930s and 1940s in connection with collectivization and the mass repression conducted under I.V. Stalin's direction, but why should this lead to the assumption that these crimes are the norm in our socialist order instead of the result of disgraceful perversions of our ideals? In the future, our textbooks will not portray the United States as a defective society steeped in violence. They will direct attention, for instance, to the role of religion and of morally healthy currents in general in the life of the American people. By the same token, textbooks in the United States should not attach absolute significance to the cases of corruption and moral decay that were widespread in our society during the period when signs of crisis were rife: After all, where did the healthy members of our public and our leadership who instituted perestroika come from?

An extensive program of future cooperation was drawn up in Wingspread. Both countries now have an urgent need for educational reform, for the use of new methods and forms of instruction. In particular, forms of instruction based on one single—monopolistic!—interpretation of historical events cannot be called promising at a time of the internationalization of knowledge. Students must know other opinions, including "the other side's." This is the only way they can form their own opinions instead of learning history by rote, as if it were a catechism. The

presentation of a broad range of opinions in textbooks is one of our future objectives, along with the exchange of video materials and the publication of a series of teaching aids describing events "from different vantage points."

Once again the outstanding American historian C. Beard comes to mind. Teachers in the United States have the fondest memories of his textbooks. Beard's books on history suffered from many defects but they were never boring. Their portrayal of the grand and constant advancement of civilization (the author felt that it was embodied in American bourgeois democracy) was combined with the historian's brilliant individuality as a writer. In our day the authors of books on U.S. history have, by their own admission, lost the "old synthesis" of science and art and have not acquired a new one. Their history resembles, to paraphrase T.S. Eliot, a "pile of shattered images." And the biggest victims, of course, are the textbooks and the students who have to read them.

What can we say? We have the same problem. We need vivid and interesting textbooks reflecting the spiritual integrity and brilliant individuality of their authors. They should make people proud of their past and love their history, but we must not forget that they must also respect the values and services of other nations and they must be interesting to read.

At a Convention of Slavic Scholars

We also attended another gathering while we were in the United States. The administrators of the U.S. Information Agency advised the members of the USSR delegation to take this opportunity to attend the annual convention of the Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies in Boston. We were told that the gathering would give us an excellent opportunity to establish contacts in the American academic community. Other Soviet representatives before us had once attended a similar convention in the middle of the 1970s.

It is probable that each Soviet historian has read some works by American Slavic scholars. And he might even have written about them, usually under the headlines "Criticism of Bourgeois Historiography" or "Falsifications of Soviet History." Some know a few dozen names and some have been able to read the works of a larger group of American scholars specializing in a particular field of Slavic studies. None of this, however, provides an adequate basis for an understanding of Slavic studies in the United States as a whole. When we arrived at the convention we found 150 discussion groups and roundtable discussions, 720 registered speakers, and thousands of delegates representing 88 centers for the study of the Soviet Union, Russia, and Eastern Europe! There was a book fair at the convention. Countless displays advertised the products of the largest publishing firms and university Sovietological centers, a huge array of Russian materials,¹ and the propaganda materials of the Voice of

America, Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Europe. There were serious monographic studies of the works of Marina Tsvetayeva, "psychological essays" on the causes of the "cold war," and an gift-boxed set of records by Vladimir Vysotskiy.

Yes, the dimensions of the convention exceeded our expectations. In all other respects, however, our impressions were ambiguous and contradictory. This was true primarily of the main thing: the effect of the current changes in our country on Slavic studies and on Sovietology in the United States.

It goes without saying that the people at the convention displayed a unanimous and vivid interest in these changes. Speakers constantly used the terms "perestroika" and "glasnost." There were special roundtable discussions and discussion groups on the democratization of our society, economic reform, and literary renewal. New titles were prominent at the book exhibit—"Gorbachev's Information Revolution," "Gorbachev and the Soviet Future".... This is certainly evidence of an enviably speedy response.

The so-called new wave in Sovietology, which first made its appearance at the end of the 1960's, has grown quite perceptible. It unites liberal historians and political scientists (including J. Hough, A. Dallin, M. Levin, S. Cohen, W. Taubman, and R. Tucker) who are trying to approach the study of Soviet society without hostility and with a certain degree of fidelity to the extremely complex factors and results of socioeconomic and political development in our country. In particular, they are elaborating the theme of the "reformist tradition" in the Soviet Union with the aid of materials from the 1920s and the 1950s and 1960s. Today these researchers are displaying redoubled energy in their criticism of the conservative Sovietologists who spent decades portraying the USSR only as a "totalitarian state" and excluding any other point of view and any possibility of changes within this society. This is how one of the "new wave" researchers, S. Cohen, the author of a biography of N.I. Bukharin, described the "school of totalitarianism" in Sovietology. Why did Sovietology overlook the reformists and the reform movement in the CPSU? Why did the changes in the Soviet Union overturn the clichés of the Sovietologists so easily? They probably need a "perestroika" of their own....

Stephen Cohen's audience contained more sympathizers than skeptics. Those who regard themselves as serious researchers acknowledged that the time had come for new approaches and new horizons in Slavic studies. In the past, during the "cold war," the researchers of even the early periods of Russian history faced invisible censorship barriers: They were expected to reaffirm the belief in the spiritual and cultural isolation and retardation of Russia from the "civilized world," and to add another brick to the historiographic foundation of the theory that a "totalitarian state" was inevitable. It is true that the younger generation of historians in U.S. Slavic

studies began surmounting this biased approach long ago. For example, they have studied the pre-revolutionary society in Russia within the context of the worldwide peasant culture and have shown great interest in rural living conditions and customs and in socioethnic aspects—the role of religion, the family, women.... Tempers flared at the Boston convention in the discussion group on the tragic events of the 1930's in the USSR. The monopoly of the "totalitarian school" (which associated the mass repression with the inherently "totalitarian" nature of the Bolshevik Party and the revolution) was replaced by a broad range of opinions. Representatives of the "new wave" believe that these events stemmed not only from I.V. Stalin's intrigues and not only from the nature of the power structure he built, but also from the complex social changes that took place in our country in those years.

Although the field of Slavic studies in the United States has had its share of confirmed anti-Soviets and ideological opportunists, we must admit that they were not the sole representatives of this field of scientific knowledge. It also attracted those who were sincerely interested in the Slavic cultures, especially the great Russian culture of the 19th and 20th centuries. Besides this, many were drawn to Russia by family or personal "roots" and the memory of ancestors.... During the years of stagnation, however, the interest in our culture declined perceptibly and fewer students in the United States wanted to study the Russian language. This made it all the more pleasant to see so many young people, undergraduates and post-graduate students, at the convention. They carefully took notes on all of the speeches. And in the discussion group on "Soviet Literature in the Period of Glasnost," young American men and women (and older Americans too) unabashedly sat on the floor or leaned against the walls of the large but crowded auditorium. The main attraction was a speech by A. Rybakov, the author of "Children of the Arbat," who was in the United States on a writing assignment at that time. His passionate and brilliant speech in defense of the moral hero and against antihumanism and scholasticism probably awakened a desire to know more about Soviet literature of recent decades in many of the young people present.

Nevertheless, there was some understandable tension in the atmosphere.

I am referring to the attitudes of many professional Sovietologists. These people are part of the academic community and make up a large segment of Slavic studies, but they are also closely connected with official, political, and ideological circles in the United States and constitute part of the expert advisory personnel reserve of the government. Until recently the field was dominated by people who had been directly involved in the creation of dogmas and theories hostile to the USSR. They helped to sustain the atmosphere of anti-Sovietism and "cold war" by taking advantage of the tragedies our people experienced during the years of lawlessness and absolute dictatorship. At the beginning of the 1980s the

"totalitarian school" gained much stronger influence in official circles, including the White House. We cannot expect it to give up its position quickly.

On the level of theory, the statements of representatives of this school at the convention essentially followed this pattern. We are not against perestroika, they said. We are convinced that the Soviet leadership seriously intends to conduct reforms, but we must be realistic.... The "realism" of speakers actually constituted psychological attacks on perestroika in the Soviet Union. These attacks were based on three theses. The first is that the current reforms are a "revolution from the top down" and will remain so. During the years of stagnation the Soviet people grew so accustomed to conformity and apathy that no mass movement for qualitative changes is anticipated in the near future. The second thesis is that the difficulties in the Soviet economy cannot be surmounted quickly. Furthermore, perestroika will certainly give rise to new types of social conflicts, including inter-ethnic conflicts. Many people who expect perestroika to improve their financial status immediately will be disillusioned. The third thesis is that the Soviet state and society are now so centralized that the current changes and tendency toward decentralization, without which no developed initiative will be possible, are unlikely to produce results. The "cult of state," they assert, has seized the overwhelming majority of the population, and the current leadership will eventually be forced by economic difficulties to "tighten the screws" once again and put an end to the dialogue with the creative intelligentsia now actively supporting the policy of glasnost and democratization.

I did not cite these theses for the sake of argument—this is not the place for arguments—but for other reasons. We have been guilty too often of dividing our American opponents into uniformly "good" and equally uniformly "bad" people, into "enemies" and "friends." The present situation in Sovietology and in Slavic studies in general is too diverse to confine the categories to those who are "for" or "against" perestroika, especially now that, as the Boston convention demonstrated, categorical judgments have given way to debates and the eager anticipation of new developments in the Soviet Union. Any of the explanations or theories now proposed by Sovietologists can be disputed by colleagues. This makes it all the more important to keep an eye on the increasingly broad range of opinions expressed there and to consider the opinions expressed by all sides, even those which might seem objectionable to us.

Besides this, the debates at the convention proved that some of the opinions of the main authorities of the "totalitarian school" might not seem so strange to "new wave" researchers. For example, Cohen agreed with those who said that the "cult of state" had become part of the fabric of Soviet society, that it could inhibit the development of initiative "from below," that it would color expectations, and that it would foster the habit of accepting all changes in their finished form—"from

above." Another political scientist of the "new wave," R. Tucker, did not disagree with R. Conquest from the Hoover Institute when he spoke of the "growth of the rightwing menace in Russia," represented by extremist elements from the Pamyat Association.

It was also striking that the new watershed in Sovietology is still on the level of emotional reactions to our changes. The optimists believe that perestroika is the start of a new era in Soviet history and in world politics, while the pessimists predict that it will suffer the same fate as the "thaw" and the economic reforms instituted in N.S. Khrushchev's time. "We are talking about two completely different societies!" exclaimed one roundtable participant.

The Slavic scholars who attended the convention were impressed by M.S. Gorbachev's speech at the festive gathering commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. They were also impressed by the upcoming summit meeting in Washington. Finally, a positive role was also played—on the "microlevel"—by the attendance of the convention by our delegation. The amazed looks we caught coming our way suggested that the presence of Soviet historians was an unexpected surprise and another positive aspect of current events and changes. The Soviet historians spoke in several discussion groups and took part in roundtable discussions, and in every case they sensed the kind interest of most of their listeners.

Of course, there were also some acute disagreements and some barbed remarks—the kind that used to be called provocative. But even the most pointed criticism of our shortcomings from the speaker's platform and in discussion groups was interpreted by convention participants within today's context, in a completely different way from yesterday's.

In one discussion group, for example, a speaker began to list the conservative features of Soviet personnel policy, the flaws in the product list system, the "clientelism" of this system, the poor showing of young personnel, the practice of making appointments by default, the disregard for criteria governing the selection of competent administrators.... Most of the people present, however, were well aware of the articles in the Soviet press in which the personnel issue had been examined with a high level of self-criticism and bluntness. During this speech, my neighbor, an American economist, wrote the following in his notebook: "The same complaints could apply to the management of the General Motors Corporation in our own country," and then passed the note to me.

Our experience at the convention proved that the possibilities for sound dialogue with representatives of Slavic studies in the United States are good, and we must make use of them.

Footnotes

1. Not only literature and publications dealing with the history of Russia since the time of Kievan Rus, but also journals, monographs, and anthologies on the politics, economics, culture, and social policies of the Soviet State.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988

U.S. Role in Afghan Settlement

18030010c Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 88 pp 54-58

[Article by V.M. Vavilov: "The Afghan Settlement and Washington"]

[Text] The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on 15 May. The CPSU Central Committee's message to the returning Soviet soldiers says that they performed their duties conscientiously and courageously and displayed a truly strong sense of internationalism.

The agreements signed in Geneva on 14 April 1988 on the political settlement of the situation in Afghanistan aroused pleasure and hope in the world public. Each side signing the agreements now must do everything within its power for their complete fulfillment. The joint Soviet-Afghan statement of 15 May 1988 says: "The Soviet Union and the Republic of Afghanistan are certain that the complete and conscientious fulfillment of commitments by all sides in accordance with the Geneva agreements will lead to the quickest possible resolution of external aspects of the Afghan problem, and this will provide strong momentum for a complete and comprehensive Afghan settlement. They are also certain that the Geneva experience will stimulate a search for solutions to other regional conflicts with a view to their specific complexities and circumstances."

This is the end of a long 6-year journey—the Afghan-Pakistani talks have been going on since summer 1982 under the mediation of personal representative of the UN secretary-general Diego Cordobes. Islamabad stubbornly refused to negotiate directly with Afghan representatives, and Cordobes had to resort to "shuttle diplomacy" to seek the agreement of both sides on each word of the accords.

For many years, the Pakistani side delayed the negotiations and frequently broke them off completely by putting forth its "main condition"—a demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the scheduling of the exact dates of their removal from Afghanistan. These factors—"the withdrawal schedule, the starting date and duration of the process"—were portrayed by opponents of political settlement as the "main obstacle" impeding the resolution of the Afghan conflict. President Zia-ul-Haq, Prime Minister and Defense Minister Junejo, and members of his administration reiterated this at every

opportunity. Representatives of the American administration also called the scheduled removal of Soviet troops the "key to the resolution of the conflict." "We expect the Soviet Union to consent to firm troop withdrawal deadlines. We feel that the schedule should be compiled in such a way that the main forces will be withdrawn first," U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz said. "The withdrawal of Soviet armed forces is the key factor in the settlement of the Afghan crisis. All other issues are being raised in order to divert attention from the main factor. This can only prolong the armed conflict," President Reagan remarked.

In an attempt to promote the quick and successful conclusion of the Afghan-Pakistani negotiations, the Soviet Union embodied its political decision to withdraw Soviet troops in a precise schedule. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev's statement on Afghanistan of 8 February 1988 stipulated the exact date when the withdrawal of Soviet troops would begin—15 May 1988. The Soviet Union's decision, which was supported by the Afghan Government, sent the opponents of the settlement into a genuine frenzy. It turned out that neither Islamabad nor Washington was actually prepared for the fundamental resolution of these issues.

Excuses to complicate the settlement process were quickly found. One was the fate of Afghan refugees. Islamabad asserted that "the proper conditions for the safe return of refugees" had not been established in Afghanistan and that they "are afraid of returning to their homes because they do not trust the government." This argument is obviously spurious: 110,000 Afghans returned to their homeland from Pakistan and Iran during just 1 year of the policy of national reconciliation, and the number could have been much higher if it had not been for the interference of the Pakistani Government and the leaders of the opposition groups holed up in Pakistan.

The issue of the formation of "a new provisional government which the refugees would trust" was attached to the invented problem of the safe return of refugees.

The Afghan delegation, expressing a desire to bring the Geneva talks to a speedy conclusion, took a constructive stand in Geneva at the round of Afghan-Pakistani talks which began on 2 March and displayed flexibility and a willingness to seek compromises. Consenting to the wishes of their Pakistani negotiating partners and guided by the spirit of the recent initiatives of Soviet and Afghan leaders, the Afghan delegates announced after preliminary consultations with Moscow that there was a possibility that the process of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan could be reduced to 9 months and that 50 percent of the Soviet military contingent could be withdrawn in the first 3 months.

As we know, the present Afghan leadership declared its willingness to share power with the opposition, including opposition members who had borne arms against the

Afghan Government for a long time and those who were abroad—in Pakistan, Iran, and other countries. Kabul invited them to take part in a dialogue, to join a coalition government, to occupy high-level positions in it, and to take part in the process of national reconciliation, in the elections to the National Council of the Republic of Afghanistan, and in the restoration of the war-ravaged economy.

And how did the mujahedin respond? The "fighters for the sacred cause of Islam," whose leaders had created the opposition "Alliance of Seven" in Peshawar, rejected these reasonable proposals, stubbornly refused to accept the results of the Geneva process, and refused to stop fighting.

The most intractable position has been taken by Gulbeddin Hekmatiar, the head of one of the opposition groups, the People's Islamic Party of Afghanistan, and the leader of the "Alliance of Seven" since the middle of March. This energetic 36-year-old, who has occasionally criticized the United States in the spirit of his godfather, Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, claims a leading role in the Afghanistan of the future, which he sees as an Islamic state based on the fundamental principles of Islam and purged of all modern developments. His organization receives a great deal of foreign assistance. He also enjoys the personal patronage of Zia-ul-Haq. His organization was the first to receive Stinger missiles from the United States. He described M.S. Gorbachev's statement as a "political and advertising maneuver." He feels that the mujahedin should form their own government, in which "there will be no room for communists and non-Muslims." He calls the policy of national reconciliation a "conspiracy against the Afghan people." On 23 February the mujahedin reached an agreement in Peshawar on the "complete structure of a provisional government" with 28 cabinet members.

There is no unity in the Afghan opposition camp. It is the scene of constant internal battles, an unconcealed struggle for power and for a share of foreign largesse, not to mention religious disagreements and tribal strife. Bloody battles often break out between different segments of the "seven," and they have been unable to share spheres of influence, weapon shipments, and even the harvest they took from the peasants by force on the Afghan territories they control. The SUNDAY TIMES warned, for example, that "the disagreements between the rebels will grow into overt confrontation even before the Soviet Union begins withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan."

In Afghanistan itself, more than 40,000 armed rebels responded to the Afghan Government's appeal for reconciliation, laying down their arms and signing ceasefire protocols, and 6,000 of their representatives became members of local coalition government bodies. More than 150,000 Afghans joined the rebels in this transition to a peaceful life. Without waiting for the consent of the opposition leaders to the formation of a coalition government, the Afghan people began forming local coalitions—in rural communities, districts, and provinces.

Only the Afghans themselves "can find an acceptable means of national accord," the Soviet government statement says. "Others can aid in this process, but it is most important that no outside action be taken to exacerbate the situation and complicate the Afghans' own search for mutual understanding...."

"The Soviet Government believes that the observance of the Geneva accords is the most essential condition for the restoration of peace in the long-suffering Afghan land and the establishment of Afghanistan as an independent, non-aligned, neutral state."

What role has the United States played in the Afghan conflict during the settlement process?

From the very beginning Washington instigated the armed struggle of the opposition forces against the revolutionary Afghan Government. It is no wonder that the armed conflict itself was called "an undeclared American war." American aid to the rebels increased from 50 million dollars in 1983 to 670 million in 1987. During the years of the undeclared war, the U.S. Congress allocated over 2 billion dollars for this purpose. It plans to spend up to a billion dollars in the current fiscal year. In April 1985 President Reagan signed Directive No 166 on the offer of assistance to the Afghan rebels and it has been fulfilled effectively, supplying their detachments with the latest weapons. They received around 900 Stinger missiles, dozens of heavy 120-mm mortars, recoilless rifles, and other modern equipment. Without this kind of material support, the rebels certainly could not have launched such a broad anti-government movement.

There are still influential forces in Washington with an interest in sustaining and even escalating the conflict and in delaying the withdrawal of Soviet troops from that country. In their hands, the "Afghan card" has become a major anti-Soviet trump card in discussions of serious international issues in the United Nations and many other international forums and it has been used to damage the prestige of the USSR. Now the "hawks" have launched a loud campaign in support of the continuation of military assistance to the rebels.

Under their influence, the Senate of the U.S. Congress passed a resolution "on the position of the Senate," which says that "the United States should not curtail, suspend, reduce, or otherwise limit aid to the Afghan resistance movement" until the USSR withdraws all of its troops and the Afghan rebel forces are "sufficiently well-equipped to preserve their integrity in the transition period."

The President of the United States has not remained objective either. On 21 March he signed a declaration on a so-called "Afghanistan Day," which also says that the United States "always supported the Afghans" and that "this support will continue." "Their struggle is our struggle," he added.

After E.A. Shevardnadze's talks with G. Shultz in Washington in March, an official State Department spokesman said that the question raised by the Pakistani side with regard to the formation of a "provisional government can be solved quickly." He also said that Islamabad's questions about the "Dhuranda border" had been removed from the agenda. This is a problem of Pakistani-Afghan relations and is therefore not subject to discussion in Geneva. Another obstacle, however, did arise: The Americans demanded the "symmetrical curtailment of arms deliveries"—in other words, the United States would stop delivering arms to the mujahedin and the USSR would stop delivering them to the Afghan Government.

Even in this complicated situation, however, Moscow and Kabul took concrete steps toward an agreement. On 7 April General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev and President Najibullah of the Republic of Afghanistan met in Tashkent and issued a joint Soviet-Afghan statement, saying that the constructive interaction of all parties involved in the settlement process had resulted in the removal of the last obstacles.

For Afghanistan, the Geneva accords mean the end of war and the return of millions of refugees to their homeland. They will give the Afghan people a chance to establish peace and harmony in their land. The agreements have established all of the necessary legal bases for the curtailment of interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

There is no question that the Geneva agreements will stimulate the development of Soviet-American relations, that they had a favorable effect on the atmosphere of the Moscow summit talks, that they represent a sound basis for the improvement of Soviet-Pakistani relations, that they will remove one of the "obstacles" to the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations, and that they will provide momentum for the resolution of regional crises in other "hot spots"—the Middle East, Central America, Africa, and Asia.

The Geneva process set a precedent of constructive interaction by the USSR and the United States, which is absolutely essential for the improvement of international relations.

The successful conclusion of the Geneva talks also demonstrated the United Nations' ability to settle the most complex regional conflicts and, consequently, other conflicts as well.

The agreements obligate the sides "to refrain from assisting, encouraging, or supporting any kind of rebel or separatist activity," and "not to allow any kind of assistance, use, or tolerance of terrorist groups, saboteurs, or subversives acting against another country." This presupposes the effective elimination of the entire range of possible moves and actions to interfere in Afghan affairs. Only irresponsible people can ignore,

circumvent, or violate the standards and principles of the settlement or find indirect ways of violating the agreements. This also applies to the delivery of arms to rebels, even though this is not mentioned in the documents.

The assertions that the United States plans to continue delivering weapons to rebel groups are regrettable. The CHICAGO TRIBUNE has even revealed the method of delivery: The CIA plans to ship them along the same route as before, using Pakistan as a transfer point.

After consenting to serve as the guarantor, along with the Soviet Union, of the political settlement of the situation in Afghanistan, the United States stipulated that "the obligations assumed by guarantors must be symmetrical." In this connection, the United States announced that it "reserves the right, corresponding to the obligations of a guarantor, to offer military assistance to the sides in Afghanistan. If the Soviet Union should show restraint in offering military assistance to the sides in Afghanistan, the United States will show similar restraint." Washington also declared that it had "no intention whatsoever of recognizing the current regime in Kabul as the legal government of Afghanistan." This was an odd statement: After all, the American embassy in Kabul was never closed.

Pakistan has an important role to play in the settlement. Its government signed a pledge not to allow the presence of political and other groups conducting subversive actions against the government of Afghanistan within its territory, not to give them shelter in camps or on bases, and not to allow their organization, training, financing, equipping, or arming. President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan said, however, that Pakistan is "willing to support the mujahedin in the attainment of their goal of a change of regimes in Kabul." He also did not object to the continuation of the delivery of American military assistance to rebel detachments along the customary routes—i.e., through Pakistan. Islamabad's position can only encourage the leaders of the rebel groups to continue the bloodshed.

A more promising prospect, however, is also apparent: The Afghan people could take charge of their own destiny, form a coalition government according to their own wishes, establish the necessary conditions for the return of refugees, and prevent anyone—the rebels of the "seven," Islamabad, or Washington—from interfering in their construction of a peaceful future.

The United Nations has displayed a great interest in the implementation of the Afghan settlement agreements signed in Geneva. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar of the United Nations called them a "tremendous achievement." He expressed regrets over the attempts to undermine them. "Everything will depend on how the agreements are carried out and on whether the signatories of the Geneva documents will observe the spirit and letter of the agreements," de Cuellar said. He reported the

appointment of Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs Diego Cordobes his personal representative in the Afghan settlement process.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988

American Studies in Bulgaria
18030010d Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 88 pp 59-60

[Article by Ya. Ivanchenko and I. Nedeva]

[Text] There are no centers in Bulgaria specializing in the study of U.S. history and contemporary U.S. politics as there are in the USSR and some other socialist countries. Researchers of American affairs work at different scientific institutes and higher academic institutions: the History Institute and Economics Institute of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, the Institute of International Relations and Socialist Integration (IMOSI) and the Institute of Contemporary Social Theories of the Presidium of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Kliment Ohridski University in Sofia and Cyril and Methodius University in Veliko Turnovo, institutes of the Academy of Social Sciences and Social Administration of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, and other centers. Nevertheless, American affairs are being studied quite intensively, and the results have been particularly noticeable in the last 10 or 15 years: Many monographs, collective works, research articles, and surveys of various aspects of contemporary U.S. foreign and domestic policy have been published, and dozens of candidate's dissertations and several doctoral dissertations have been written on a broad range of topics connected with U.S. history and politics.

Bulgarian-American relations during various periods of history constitute one of the main research topics of Bulgarian scholars of American affairs. American policy in relations with Bulgaria and U.S. policy in the Balkans from the second half of the 19th century to the end of World War II, after the victory of the socialist revolution in Bulgaria on 9 September 1944, are discussed in detail in works by V. Bozhin, A. Velichkov, A. Pantev, P. Petkov, V. Toshkova, V. Traykov, P. Shopov, and others. General trends in postwar U.S. foreign policy and the effects of this policy on relations with the People's Republic of Bulgaria are discussed in works by D. Angelova, Khr. Mircheva, G. Stefanov, and G. Todorchev.

Many researchers are studying contemporary U.S. foreign policy. Some of the main research topics are the foreign policy doctrines of American administrations of the 1970s and 1980s and U.S. arms policy, including U.S. policy on strategic and nuclear arms (I. Boyev, D. Pavlov, Ch. Palaveyev, V. Savov, R. Solov, and N. Khristov); the interaction of U.S. foreign policy and ideology during the period of international detente and contemporary theories of American hegemonism (Yu. Vladikova and P. Karaivanova); the roots of the current

administration's militarism and chauvinism and the purpose of contemporary American expansionism (Ye. Aleksandrov, G. Mikhaylov, and L. Todorova). Some topics of special concern are the regional aspects of contemporary U.S. foreign policy and, in particular, bloc strategy in U.S. policy in the Balkans (I. Boyev and I. Nedeva); military cooperation with Japan and South Korea in the Far East (P. Mangachev, V. Tsachevskiy, and I. Yakimova) and Chinese-American relations (Z. Zakhariyev); strategies in the Near and Middle East (E. Vasilyev, I. Keremichiyev, and P. Fileva); policy in Latin America (P. Karaivanova); and relations with West European countries. The collective work "Reaganism in U.S. Foreign Policy," compiled by researchers from IMOSI, is an important general study.¹

Bulgarian researchers have also been successful in the study of the domestic political problems of American capitalism, especially the evolution of state-legal institutions and the social structure of American society, the ideological doctrines of American imperialism, the development of the workers and communist movement, and the current role of mass democratic and peace movements (works by P. Karaivanova, G. Karasimeonov, S. Savov, V. Tabakova, and others). Some researchers are studying state-monopolist regulation in the United States, signs of crisis in the American economy, the monetary contradictions of imperialism, and contemporary bourgeois economic theories (R. Avramov, V. Ayakova, S. Davidova, and A. Leonidov). Works by Sofia University Professor A. Pantev occupy a prominent place among studies of American history and historiography, although it must be said that scientific investigation in this sphere appears less impressive in general than in other spheres.

Bulgarian researchers have established broader contact with scholars of American affairs in other socialist countries in recent years. Several researchers have worked in the United States on short- and long-term assignments. Conferences and symposiums on various aspects of U.S. history and contemporary politics have been organized and have been attended by representatives of other countries.

Footnotes

1. "Reyganizmut vuv vunshchiata politika na SAShch," compiled and edited by Ts. Tsanev, Sofia, 1985.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988

U.S. Election Issues
18030010e Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 88 (signed to press 25 May 88) pp 64-70

[Article by Yu.A. Ivanov: "Keeping the Elections in Mind"]

[Text] The complex and contradictory 8-year period in American history connected with the name of President

Reagan is coming to an end. Who will succeed him? What will Congress be like after the elections? The future of the country will depend largely on the answers to these questions. We should remember that on 8 November the American voters will not only choose the next occupant of the White House but will also elect 33 senators and all 435 members of the House of Representatives.

The last 2 years of Reagan's presidency have been marked by divided rule. The President is a Republican and both houses of the 100th Congress are controlled by Democrats. This is not an uncommon situation in American politics, but the present administration did not encounter it until after the 1986 elections. Up to 1987, the Republicans held the majority in the Senate for 6 years, and this certainly facilitated the administration's relations with Congress. The transfer of power in both houses to a Democratic majority, especially at the end of the term of a President who would not be running for re-election, added the element of fierce competition to the relations between the Capitol and the White House.

It was already apparent during the first session of the 100th Congress in 1987, which turned out to be one of the longest sessions on record and did not come to an end until just before Christmas. THE NEW YORK TIMES summed up its activity with this brief but murderous remark: "It was a year of posturing and paralysis."¹ Both Congress and the President were concerned less with the resolution of real problems than with the declaration of campaign slogans appealing to voters and with the use of effective political gestures to pave the way for their own party's victory in the coming elections. Furthermore, for a long time Ronald Reagan, who had won several battles with the Congress during his term in office, simply could not accept the fact that the new alignment of forces offered no alternative to compromise. The competition between the sides paralyzed legislative activity: This was one of the least productive congressional sessions of recent years.

During the first 3 months of the session there were two tests of strength on Capitol Hill between the new Democratic majority and the President, whose position had been weakened by the "Iran-contra" scandal. Reagan was defeated both times.

The clean water bill which the President had previously vetoed was introduced and approved again without any changes whatsoever at the very beginning of the session. Reagan rejected the bill again, but his veto was overridden this time by a second vote in both houses. This was the first signal of the new Democratic majority's refusal to accept a subordinate role. Reagan, however, paid no attention to the warning and, what is more, started the second fight with Congress himself.

It broke out over a highway development bill envisaging the financing of around 100 projects in almost all of the states. It is understandable that the overwhelming majority of members of Congress, both Democrats and

Republicans, had an interest in its passage. As Senate Majority Leader R. Byrd (West Virginia) said, "pot-holes are nonpartisan."² The President, however, decided to challenge Congress' decision and hoped to win the battle.

Reagan vetoed the bill at the end of March. In the hope of winning voter sympathy and in accordance with the tradition of publicly denigrating the opposing party, the President accused the Democrats of wanting another huge increase in spending at a time of a growing federal budget deficit. The accusations were untrue: The highway projects would be financed through a special fund not connected with the budget. Demagoguery undermined the White House.

The President was wrong to gamble with his prestige. The House of Representatives overrode his veto by an overwhelming majority of votes. In the Senate the struggle was particularly dramatic: One ballot followed another, lobbyists did not leave the senators alone for a single minute, and at one point it even appeared that the President would win by one vote.... To win, the President actually needed only one of the votes of the 13 Republicans who supported the bill. Reagan took the extreme measure of going to Capitol Hill himself and spending an hour and a half with the "group of 13" in a vain attempt to gain the support of at least one of these senators. "I am asking you for one vote," the President said. His attempts were futile: On 2 April the Senate overrode the presidential veto by a vote of 67 to 33.

The two defeats at the very start of the session proved that the new Democratic majority was quite strong, that the President's political position at the end of his term was quite different from what it had been at the peak of his popularity, and that the once united Republican ranks in Congress were showing signs of a breach. The President had obviously overestimated his own abilities, and although he later threatened to veto various bills for various reasons, no other confrontations of this kind took place during the first session.

The relations between the White House and the Capitol became particularly tense during the discussion of arms control amendments (it went on for several months). The groups advocating the observance of existing Soviet-American agreements in this area and further advancement toward a more stable and secure world acquired a stronger position in the House of Representatives and the Senate. During the very first days of the session they reintroduced amendments which had been discussed earlier in connection with disarmament: on a binding U.S. commitment to observe SALT II numerical limits; on the banning of nuclear tests with a force of over 1 kiloton; on the extension of the moratorium on tests of the antisatellite system involving the use of an F-15 fighter against real targets in space; on the banning of the testing and deployment of weapons systems prohibited by the ABM Treaty, and some others.

The issue of the observance of the ABM Treaty was the focus of attention at the beginning of this year. According to reports, the administration was discussing plans for the acceleration of SDI tests for the purpose of the deployment of its first tier in the beginning of the 1990s. To free themselves of restrictions, the supporters of the SDI advanced a "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty: This interpretation distorted the spirit and letter of the document and nullified its limitations. These plans immediately encountered strong opposition on Capitol Hill, headed by Chairman S. Nunn of the Senate Committee on the Armed Services (Democrat, Georgia), a far from liberal man but a competent and influential expert on military policy.

Last March S. Nunn spoke three times in the Senate to refute all of the arguments in favor of the "broad" interpretation that had been prepared by State Department legal adviser A. Sofaer. Taking a step with such massive political and legal implications as the revision of treaty limitations, Nunn said, would require much better reasons than those submitted to Congress (he described the latter as "woefully inadequate"). Nunn advised "concentration on the real problems the nation faces in connection with the strategic balance and arms control."³

The opponents of the White House chose the tactic of adding amendments to all of the bills having any relationship to this issue, hoping for their approval in spite of the administration's resistance. These amendments were first included by the House of Representatives in the text of a bill on additional appropriations for the current fiscal year. These amendments were more of a demonstrative nature because it was clear that there was little chance of their passage. By the middle of the summer, when it was time to make the final decision on the bill, the House of Representatives gave up the amendments so that they would not undermine its ratification.

By that time, however, the same amendments and demands for the observance of the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty had been included in a military spending bill approved by the House in May, which defines areas of military construction and programs for the coming fiscal year.

The discussion of the bill on military expenditures in the Senate had some unusual features. The Senate Armed Services Committee, which had drawn up the bill, included statements about the need to observe SALT II numerical limits and the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty, which would have impeded the administration's attempts to establish the "broad" interpretation. The text of the bill drafted by the committee aroused pointed criticism: The President unequivocally threatened to veto any draft disagreeing with the White House's position. To please the administration, the Republicans in the Senate arranged for the procedural obstruction of the bill, and the Democratic majority did

not have enough votes to surmount this opposition. The Republicans blocked the discussion of the document in the Senate for almost 4 months, and it was not until September, close to the end of the current fiscal year, that they had to give up these obstructions. The Senate finally approved its draft of the military spending bill, and it was turned over to a conference committee along with the House draft.

The differences between the two were significant. The House envisaged military expenditures totaling 289 billion dollars, but the Senate envisaged around 303 billion (the administration's original request was for 312 billion dollars). The House envisaged expenditures of 3.1 billion dollars for the SDI program, and the Senate envisaged around 4.2 billion (the administration had requested 5.7 billion). Both houses prohibited the administration's expenditure of funds on the development of weapons over and above SALT II numerical limits and the acceleration of the testing of space-based antisatellite systems and postulated the need for the advance consent of Congress for the "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Besides this, the House demanded a ban on tests of the antisatellite system against real targets in space and refused to allocate funds for nuclear tests with a force of over 1 kiloton.

President Reagan continued to insist that he would not sign a bill with these amendments. Congressional leaders realized that they would be unable to override a presidential veto: More than 50 senators had voted for the amendments but around 40 had voted against them, and the hope of a two-thirds majority was therefore unrealistic. The supporters of the amendments, however, intended to continue the battle and to include them in the bill on defense appropriations, the document pronouncing the final verdict on allocations for military needs. Just as in previous years, this bill was supposed to be part of a comprehensive bill on federal budget appropriations. This was done because the President cannot veto part of a bill, and vetoing this entire bill would be tantamount to cutting off funds for all government agencies. Another serious confrontation between the administration and Congress seemed to be taking shape.

Things did not, however, go this far: Plans for a Soviet-American summit meeting in December were announced. The supporters of the amendments in Congress, especially the Democrats, were in a politically awkward position: The administration could now accuse them of undermining the President's position at the coming meeting. White House officials also realized, however, that some kind of compromise had to be found, because some forecasts suggested that the tension in relations with Congress could reach a critical point in the beginning of December, and this would really put the President in a difficult position.

The two sides had to seek a compromise, and they began negotiating the matter on the first day of November. The administration was represented in the talks by White

House Chief of Staff H. Baker and then National Security Adviser (now Secretary of Defense) F. Carlucci, and Congress was represented by Chairman S. Nunn of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the ranking Republican on the committee J. Warner (Virginia), Chairman L. Aspin of the House Armed Services Committee (Democrat, Wisconsin), and the ranking Republican on the committee W. Dickinson (Alabama). The talks led to a compromise, and it was reinforced in a conference bill on defense expenditures. The two houses passed the bill in the second half of November, and Reagan signed it on 4 December. What agreement did the two sides reach?

The bill prohibits the testing of antisatellite weapons against real targets in space as long as the Soviet Union also refrains from testing these systems. In other words, Congress extended the moratorium, in effect since 1985, on these tests to the current fiscal year. The administration's request for funds for the development of this weapons system was reduced by more than half.

In exchange for the amendment on the antisatellite weapon, the House of Representatives had to give up its amendment regarding the prohibition of nuclear tests with a force of over 1 kiloton.

The text of the bill contains no references to the SALT II treaty and does not demand the observance of its numerical limitations; this was a concession to the President, who had insisted on it. Nevertheless, the final agreement will considerably decelerate the administration's scheduled departure from treaty obligations. In November 1987 the United States surpassed the SALT II carrier ceiling by 23 units. The law envisages the removal of the obsolete Poseidon submarine (16 SLBM's) from commission, but it does permit the conversion of two B-52 bombers a month into cruise missile carriers. Therefore, by 1 October 1988 (the beginning of the next fiscal year) the SALT II carrier ceiling could be exceeded by 26 units, and not by the 42 envisaged in administration plans.

At the insistence of the administration, the law does not demand the observance of the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty and does not even mention it. Nevertheless, it does say that allocations for fiscal year 1988 can be used only for the specific program of SDI tests which do not violate the traditional interpretation of the treaty. These funds cannot be used even for the purchase of equipment for possible future tests that might transcend projected boundaries and violate the treaty.

Allocations for work on the SDI program during the current fiscal year will amount to 3.9 billion dollars. Some American experts have estimated that the reduction of the SDI allocations requested by the administration will slow down the work in this field and that the administration will be unable to make any decisions by the scheduled date of 1992 on whether or not to begin producing systems that might be deployed in the first

phase of the creation of a space ABM system. According to reports in the press, this January the congressional budget restrictions forced the Defense Department to cancel a contract for over 480 million dollars with the McDonnell-Douglas corporation on the development of a "Star Wars" particle beam weapon.

As we can see, President Reagan's intractable position forced the Capitol to make certain concessions, but the White House also had to give up some of its demands and agree to some restrictions. Clashes between the administration and the Congress over these problems have been almost mandatory in Washington politics in recent years. The compromise reached at the end of last year's battle was not the end of the fight, but only the conclusion of one phase of it.

Less than a month after the beginning of the second session of the 100th Congress the Democratic majority leaders again raised the issue of the strict observance of the Soviet-American arms control agreements, including the ABM Treaty—this time in connection with the discussion of the INF Treaty in the Senate, a discussion which went on for several months.⁴

It is obvious that this and other important questions of disarmament will come up again when Congress examines the defense budget for fiscal year 1989. The guarantee of international security and stability and the prevention of nuclear catastrophe have become issues of such importance to the American public that responsible American legislators simply cannot ignore them.

They will also have to bear this in mind during the discussion of the most painful and difficult problem facing the Congress in Reagan's last years in office: the insupportable federal budget deficits which are undermining the economy and are connected to a considerable extent with the level of military spending. As *TIME* magazine put it, "the budget battle has become the year's most contentious issue."⁵

It began when the President submitted his draft budget for fiscal year 1988 to the Congress in January 1987. In essence, this draft did not contain anything new and was based, as always, on the well-known "pillars" of Reagan's ideology: higher military spending, cuts in social programs, and the categorical refusal to raise taxes. It would seem that the President is completely ignoring the fact that even the last Congress (in which the Republicans controlled the Senate) rejected similar drafts twice in the 2 previous years. The desire for a politically convenient posture turned out to be stronger than the wish to reduce the budget deficit. The President decided to challenge the Democratic majority in the Congress.

Predictably, the President's draft budget was rejected. It was far from a simple matter, however, for the Democratic majority in the two houses to draw up an alternative draft. The process revealed serious differences of

opinion within this majority on such fundamental matters as the level of military spending, the priority of domestic programs, and the size of the permissible budget. The Republicans in the Congress chose to play the role of disinterested critics and frequently refused to cooperate in the resolution of these problems. It was not until the very end of June that the two houses passed an FY 1988 budget resolution.

The resolution envisaged the reduction of the budget deficit to 133.9 billion dollars by cutting expenditures on non-military budget items by 11 billion dollars and raising taxes by 19.3 billion. As for military expenditures, the resolution made their slight increase conditional upon the President's consent to raise taxes; otherwise, the defense budget would remain frozen.

It is almost an axiom of American elections that the candidate proposing higher taxes will lose the race. Foreseeing the campaign battles of 1988, the Republicans, headed by the President, quickly took this opportunity to attack the Democratic majority in Congress. "In the critical matchup between those who want to keep spending your money and raising your taxes, and those of us who resist a return to the old policies...we have now reached breakpoint,"⁶ Reagan told the American people, and he warned that he would veto any bill envisaging an increase in taxes.

The President's dogmatic obstinacy and "posture" caused a deadlock in the drafting of a budget and of bills on appropriations. Neither Congress nor the President would concede, although the new fiscal year began on 1 October. Only "Black Monday," the stock market crash of 19 October, which was largely due to the huge U.S. budget deficit, forced both sides to seek immediate solutions. The President had a meeting with congressional leaders in the White House on 26 October, and talks began in the Capitol the next day. Congress was represented by six Democrats and six Republicans, and the administration was represented by Secretary of the Treasury J. Baker, White House Chief of Staff H. Baker, and OMB Director J. Miller.

The negotiations were lengthy and tense. A general agreement was not announced until 20 November. Then the Congress had to decide exactly which programs would be cut or cancelled and which taxes would be instituted. This was not an easy task because there was immediate opposition to the agreement in the Capitol. The Republicans expressed dissatisfaction with the institution of new taxes and the limitation of the military budget; many Democrats believed that the social sacrifices were excessive.

There were two strong factors, however, motivating Congress to consent to the terms of the agreement. The first, and probably the most convincing, was the absence of choice. Chairman W. Gray (Democrat, Pennsylvania) of the House Budget Committee had this to say: "Show me a serious alternative that would win majority support

in both houses."⁷ There was no such alternative. There was also another factor: In the absence of an agreement, the automatic cuts in expenditures on all items envisaged in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law would have gone into effect, and most of the congressmen did not want this.

The complicated process of drafting the appropriate bills representing the final agreement between the congressional leadership and the administration took around a month. The lengthy and relentless debates did not come to an end until the night of 21 December, when both houses approved two bills: on the reduction of the budget deficit and on appropriations for fiscal year 1988. The last was approved by a majority of one vote in the House of Representatives (209 to 208). Up to the last moment there was no certainty that the President would sign the acts, but Reagan signed both bills on 22 December, and they went into effect.

The budget deficit reduction act envisages a reduction of 17.6 billion dollars this year by means of an increase of 9 billion dollars in taxes, the cancellation of some tax benefits, the reduction of the rate of increase in appropriations for the program of medical aid for the elderly ("Medicare") and farm subsidies, and several other measures.

In accordance with congressional practice in recent years, the act on appropriations unified all acts on funds for government agency operations in the amount of 598 billion dollars. The act envisaged cuts of 15.6 billion in expenditures, and this, along with the measures stipulated in the first act, should reduce the budget deficit by a total of 33.2 billion dollars in the current fiscal year. Appropriations for domestic programs will amount to 176.8 billion dollars. The ceiling on military appropriations was set at 291.5 billion dollars.

As soon as these bills had been passed, many authoritative experts expressed doubts about the ability of these measures to reduce the budget deficit. Even if its growth should be slowed down to some degree, this will not be enough.... It is probable that these predictions will come true: By February the Congressional Budget Office was already publishing estimates predicting a deficit of 157 billion dollars in the current year's federal budget and of 176 billion in FY 1989, whereas the act envisages respective figures of 144 billion and 136 billion. According to American Enterprise researcher W. Schneider, this legislation could result in "the postponement of any serious deficit reduction until the arrival of the next administration."⁸

One of the factors impeding the quick passage of legislation on the reduction of the budget deficit was the President's insistence on the inclusion of funds for the Nicaraguan contras in the appropriations, and he eventually got his way. Last year Congress discussed this issue several times. The disclosures connected with the "Iran-contra" scandal did not keep Ronald Reagan from

making several attempts to continue financing the counterrevolutionary gangs. Congress denied the President's requests repeatedly, but initiatives regarding the "humane" assistance of the Nicaraguan revolution's opponents were eventually revived. What is the reason for Congress' submissiveness? In general, legislators are inclined, except in rare cases, to concede to the President in matters of foreign policy, but they are particularly pliant just before decisive elections. Why should rivals be given a chance to criticize a presidential candidate because the "loss" of Nicaragua was his party's fault?

Something similar occurred in the Capitol during the discussion of American intervention in the Persian Gulf. There was no shortage of draft resolutions and speeches demanding the enforcement of the military powers act of 1973, but Ronald Reagan objected so vehemently that not one of these resolutions was passed. Congress' decision not to enforce the law was based on the simple political ploy of not entering into another battle with the President, but assigning him all of the responsibility for ventures in distant seas and reserving the right to criticize him and display indignation if matters should turn out badly.

The leaders of the Democratic majority in Congress put forth a substantial legislative program, but the prevailing atmosphere of fierce competition with the President and of political maneuvering during the first session of the 100th Congress interfered with its implementation. The Congress did not finish discussing the bills on trade, on social security reform, on a new system of health insurance, on a minimum wage, and many others.

These bills are now on the agenda of the current session, but it is unlikely that they will have a better chance of passing now. The reasons for the last session's lack of productivity are now hampering Congress' work even more. Whatever any congressman does now, whether he makes a speech, puts forth an initiative, or takes part in editing the text of resolutions and bills, he will be thinking about the coming elections each day and each hour. Only one thing is certain: The legislators will make every effort to finish the session earlier and return as quickly as possible to the electoral districts where their fate will be decided.

Footnotes

1. Quoted in: INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 23 December 1987.
2. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 5 April 1987.
3. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 13 March 1987, p S-3172.
4. The discussion of the INF Treaty in the Senate is one of the main objectives of the current congressional session. Our journal will report on the proceedings and the results of the discussion of this document in an upcoming issue—Ed.

5. TIME, 29 June 1987, p 26.

6. Ibid.

7. THE WASHINGTON POST, 21 November 1987.

8. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 24-25 December 1987.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988

Book Review: 'Meeting at the Elbe'

18030010f Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 88 pp 84-86

[Review by Yevgeniy Dolmatovskiy of book "Meeting at the Elbe. Recollections of Soviet and American World War II Veterans," compiled and edited by S. Krasilshchik (USSR) and M. Scott (United States), Izdatelstvo APN, Capra Press, 1988, 210 pages]

[Text] The omnipresence of television has probably made the image of the bridge a deeply meaningful symbol for millions of inhabitants of our planet: The two great powers from which all countries and peoples expect so much and on which they are pinning their hopes for peace are united by a gigantic bridge held up by piles driven into the heavens.

The image of a bridge leading to peace excites people and fills them with hope, but I want to look back into the depths of memory and recall not a symbolic bridge, but a common railroad bridge which had just been blown up and destroyed, with charred and broken trusses, with rails curling like spirals, and with its spans in the water below.

This is how we saw the railroad bridge across the Elbe, the last frontier of the allied armies marching from the east and from the west to defeat fascism.

My style of writing might seem too lofty and not quite acceptable to the modern reader, but he must forgive my old-fashioned way of speaking. After all, the events I am discussing took place so long ago that our grandsons might call them ancient history.

The meeting on the Elbe took place at the end of April 1945. Soviet and American soldiers began climbing onto the bombed remains of the railroad bridge from both shores. I think there were two on one side and three on the other. Today I cannot remember the exact numbers. The movie camera operators had not arrived yet....

Creeping along the broken girders and rails above the strong spring current of the Elbe was dangerous, especially because the soldiers on both sides were still under fire, still in battle with a third side—Hitler's army, the half-crazed SS, who were in the throes of death but were all the more dangerous for that reason....

The shrill whistle of bullets and the sporadic sound of shells and bombs were the accompaniment to these events. But over the din of the cannonade we could also hear jubilant cries of "Hooray!" and voices exclaiming:

"Russians!"

"Americans!"

I am a member of the older generation of Soviet people, of the dying breed of World War II veterans, of those who were in Berlin and on the Elbe in April and early May 1945, and the reader must forgive me for the emotions my memories have aroused in me.

What made me recall the bridge across the Elbe was a book of memoirs by Soviet and American World War II veterans which was just published in Russian and English by the Soviet APN publishing house and the American Capra Press.

The book is called "Meeting on the Elbe" and it represents one of the new bridges erected between our peoples and countries in the new international atmosphere.

Many articles, documents, and books of memoirs have been published in the decades since the war, and the events of World War II have been the subject of novels, short stories, films, and historical studies. One of the final episodes of the war, the meeting near Torgau, has also been discussed at length, but there are episodes whose importance is not judged by their duration or by the number of people involved: The meeting of the allies went down in history and became a symbol.

Although most of the articles and memoirs included in the Soviet-American book have been published in various periodicals at various times, they represent a new, complete, and purposeful historical document capable of arousing emotions in readers of different generations. Although all of the authors are past the age of 60, I believe that the book has much to offer to young readers. It will arouse their emotions, will make them think, and might even help in forming their character and their views on the future.

Each word and each sentence spoken by the participants in the meeting on the Elbe will acquire special importance and significance as the years go by. Unfortunately, the information about the authors usually includes the dates of their birth and death, and the fact that they are no longer with us compels us to regard these pages as a testament, a legacy, a request and a demand addressed to their descendants: Cherish the friendship between the Soviet and American people, cherish peace on earth! There is no question that the meeting was predetermined by everything that happened in World War II. I think I am not exaggerating when I say that the rendezvous on the Elbe became the main event in the lives of the soldiers and officers who were chosen by fate to be the first to embrace one another on the bridge.

Compiling editors Semen Krasilshchik (USSR) and Mark Scott (United States) skillfully arranged all of the material to provide the reader with a flowing and vivid account of the events and to make him feel as if he had been present in Germany, near Torgau, on the banks of the historic river at the end of April 1945.

This was a triumph, the apotheosis of joy, but as a frontline soldier, I must provide a belated description of the dangers hidden along the seemingly idyllic banks. In the night of the first of May, several days after the linkup on the Elbe, I witnessed another historic event in Berlin. General Krebs of Hitler's infantry came to our Guards Army command point with a white flag to report the death of Hitler and to make certain proposals which seemed suspicious then but were later irrefutably corroborated: The rulers of the dying reich hoped to cause a confrontation between the allied armies, destroy the anti-Hitler coalition, and continue World War II with a different alignment of forces.

Joseph Polowsky, an American hero of the linkup on the Elbe, made the following accurate and astute observation in his memoirs: "The commanders were afraid that there might be confrontations if our armies would arrive at the linkup in battle formation.... For this reason, Eisenhower and Zhukov decided that the armies would come to a halt 25 kilometers away from one another. We stopped on the Mulde and they stopped on the Elbe."

We who were on the battlefields of the last historic days of World War II could feel it in our bones, as they say, when complex and acute problems in international relations became a persistent and irresistible part of the soldier's common duties, and when circumstances turned common soldiers into diplomats and plenipotentiaries of their states.

And not only the soldiers! During my short trip from charred and smoking Berlin to the south (i.e., to the Elbe), on the roads of Germany I saw groups and columns of people liberated from the camps: Frenchmen, Italians, Belgians, Norwegians, Netherlands, Yugoslavs, Englishmen, Austrians—and, of course, our worn-out countrymen. All of them were walking in different directions carrying their own flags. This was a global triumph and global fraternization, although dozens of questions were being raised.

The allied armies were moving in from two sides, gripping Hitler's troops in a vise, and this is vividly described with the utmost accuracy in the book.

Yes, the meeting of the Russians and Americans was inevitable, it was envisaged in agreements, and it was coordinated by headquarters, but the Soviet-American book now testifies that the meeting was actually accomplished by common people with extremely modest titles and ranks—sergeants and lieutenants in the recent past and students, clerks, workers, and farmers in the near future.... This naturally arouses thoughts about what role

those who are called the common people play in world history. Here is how uncommon they turned out to be, how noble and strong, how they behaved correctly and guilelessly in an emergency. Generals and commanders-in-chief met one another after the linkup on the blown-up bridge and on pontoons, but the first to shake hands were common soldiers.

The world is gradually beginning to realize how great a role the common people play. At the time of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva (November 1985), Buck Kotzebue, an American from the first reconnaissance group to reach the bridge and the first man to creep along the destroyed girders of the bridge across the Elbe to embrace a Soviet comrade in arms, made a speech. Here is what he said in Geneva: "We were 100-percent sincere when we said there should be no more war. We do not want to experience it again ourselves and we do not want our children to experience it."

The antiwar sentiments in the anthology of Soviet and American recollections of the meeting on the Elbe can be effective in the present situation. It is a complex one, and all of us know that many difficulties and problems lie ahead, but the mood of the young soldiers in 1945, their optimism, their spirit, and their feelings of peace are conveyed to us today, and I am certain that they were conveyed to their descendants. The people who won the historic victory over fascism speak to us in Russian and English and also—we would like to hope—in the language of peace and friendship, which will become a universal language in the next century and the next millennium.

As a writer, I am most interested in human characters and images. I will not restrain myself and I will say that the authors of this book, the men who were present at the linkup, are remarkable and wonderful men. They created an excellent model of human interaction, perhaps without even suspecting that they had done this, a model which absolutely must be used today and in the future if we want to save our planet and life on it. I know some of the Soviet participants in these events and I can attest to the absolute sincerity of their words and their gallant fidelity to the vow of friendship they made on the Elbe. I met some of their American comrades for the first time on the pages of this book and I am pleased to make their acquaintance. I regard them as true Americans and the best representatives of their people. The bonds of Soviet-American friendship were tied so tightly on the Elbe that none of the circumstances of other times (I am speaking of the "cold war"—it is no wonder that we print this term enclosed in quotation marks; I would even put it in parentheses!) could sever them.

If we take the bridge on the Elbe as a reference point, this book of memoirs could be called one of the new bridges being erected today in the interests of peace.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988

Conference of Post-Graduate American Specialists
18030010g Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 88 pp 116-119

[Report on first Moscow conference of post-graduate American specialists at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies on 3-4 December 1987]

[Text] The American capitalism of the late 1980s has several new features. On the one hand, the U.S. economy is witnessing the intensive development of the new technological method of production, the radical severance of earlier intra- and inter-sectorial ties, and the considerable modification of the mechanism for the state-monopolist regulation of economic processes. On the other hand, the United States' position in the world capitalist economy has changed considerably and this has put the prospects for American leadership of the capitalist world in question. The complexity of the foreign economic situation is being compounded by the negative effects of the "rightwing conservative experiment," especially in government finances and the social sphere. The appearance of qualitatively new economic problems has promoted the reconsideration of some aspects of U.S. foreign policy and military strategy.

The distinctive features of the current period, its many contradictory tendencies, some of which are absolutely critical, and possible trends in future U.S. economic and political development were the main topics of discussion at the first Moscow conference of post-graduate American specialists in the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences (ISKAN) on 3-4 December 1987. The conference on "The United States on the Threshold of the 1990s: Prospects for Socioeconomic and Political Development," was held on the initiative of the ISKAN post-graduate council with the assistance of the institute's council of young scholars. The forum was attended by representatives from ISKAN, the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences (IMEMO), Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov (MGU), the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MGIMO), and several other organizations.

The conference was called to order by Deputy Director of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies A.A. Kokoshin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Commending the organizers' timely initiative, he stressed the importance of attempts to discern long-range trends in U.S. economic and political development. In A.A. Kokoshin's opinion, a reliable scientific forecast must be based on the thorough analysis of tendencies in the last 20 or 25 years. To avoid simple extrapolation, however, the researcher must study these tendencies within the context of the 1980's, demonstrating intellectual ingenuity and breadth. A.A. Kokoshin wished conference participants this kind of scientific boldness and independence in the investigation of fundamental topics.

Fundamental aspects of American economic management were discussed in the first discussion group, conducted by Candidate of Economic Sciences A.G. Kvasov.

In his report, A.M. Volkov (ISKAN) stressed that intensive changes had taken place in the late 1970s and 1980s in the nature of capital accumulation by American corporations. A new mechanism for the intersectoral transfer of capital is taking shape on the macroeconomic level. Without this, the transition to the new technological order in the U.S. economy would hardly be possible. The internationalization of the accumulation process will have a significant effect on the development of this mechanism in the 1990s. The non-productive use of financial resources has also increased considerably. Investments in securities, frequently of a speculative nature, are preventing the expansion of productive investments (although the percentage of these investments in total American corporate investments is expected to stabilize in the next few years).

The current stage is distinguished by massive changes in the production system of traditional sectors of the American economy. In the opinion of A.V. Dyumulen (ISKAN), their transfer to the new technical base will be accompanied by a decrease in the number of enterprises and the improvement of product quality. Analyzing the data and conclusions of some experts with regard to the declining role of the traditional sector of industry in the American economy, the speaker expressed the opinion that its role in the economy of the capitalist world's largest country will not be reduced and is much more likely to be augmented.

The results of the discussion of problems in accumulation and the mechanism for the interaction of traditional and high technology sectors were summed up in a report by R.N. Novruzov (ISKAN). In his opinion, the cyclical crisis which will mark the end of the period of growth in the 1980s cannot seriously decelerate the development of several deep-seated tendencies in the U.S. economy, especially the continued modernization of the production potential of the traditional sector. This will be accompanied by the intensive growth of such high technology fields of production as fiber optics, genetic engineering, telecommunications, etc. Analyzing the problems of the budget and trade deficits, which are already posing a serious threat to the stable development of the American economy, the speaker stressed that their constructive resolution within the near future seems improbable. He also said, however, that the term "deficit" should not be regarded only as a negative concept. Even with a negative balance of trade, for example, imported equipment can lead to the fundamental retooling of industry.

In his report on the organizational and financial aspects of scientific and technical progress in the American economy, V.V. Soldatov (IMEMO) thoroughly analyzed the latest trends in ventures. Stressing that investments

of this type are of a cyclical nature in general, the speaker predicted several long-range trends in this sphere in the 1990s. These were not only the growth of investment volume, but also the interesting possibility of the transfer of financial resources from branches connected with production and the use of microelectronics to other promising spheres in which stable profits will compensate for the need for much larger initial investments.

The report by V.D. Milovidov (IMEMO) on the reorganization of the U.S. credit system was the logical conclusion to the discussion of domestic economic problems. The main objective of the development of the credit system in the 1990s will be its transformation into a flexible mechanism more easily adaptable to processes in the American economy. This will be promoted by the continued standardization of the operations of credit and finance establishments, their integration with industrial corporations, the higher concentration of monetary capital, etc.

Questions were raised at the conference about the relations among the three centers of imperialism at the beginning of the 1990s. Most of the speakers expressed the opinion that the tendency toward cooperation would prevail over the tendency toward inter-imperialist rivalry in the next decade under the influence of the processes that took place in the world capitalist economy in the 1980s. This is connected above all with the objective requirements of capitalist production, which is undergoing restructuring and retooling. Speakers also stressed that the United States still leads the capitalist countries, despite Japan's successes in the use of new technologies. All of this, however, does not exclude the possibility of local "trade wars," the institution of protectionist measures by partner-rivals, etc.

For example, the reports by N.F. Kurnikova (ISKAN) and N.I. Oksamitnaya (IMEMO) on the positions of the United States and Western Europe in the spheres of capital migration and scientific and technical progress stressed that the traditional view of relations between these two centers of imperialism as unrelieved struggle and competition is not always justified. If we view U.S. foreign economic ties with Western Europe through the prism of "national socioeconomic strategies of scientific and technical progress," for example, we can see several fields in which the Old World is not even trying to overtake the United States and is content to "follow the leader." The validity of this approach is corroborated in part by changes in reciprocal U.S.-West European direct investments.

Ye.V. Popova (ISKAN) discussed the prospects for the development of U.S. trade and economic relations with the new industrial countries. She said that the latter are taking shape as dependent economic structures reacting flexibly to changes in the U.S. economy. We can assume that in the 1990's the "draining" function of these countries, their role in alleviating structural disparities in the American economy, will be augmented.

Military strategy and international security were the topics in the second discussion group, led by Candidate of Economic Sciences P.V. Gladkov.

It was the unanimous opinion that the present level of military equipment and the increasing interdependence of all of the states on our planet are introducing qualitatively new features into earlier beliefs about stability and security.

The disclosure of tendencies in the development of U.S. military production is of great significance in determining the prospects for military-strategic parity. The restructuring of the military-state mechanism of American capitalism was the subject of a report by B.I. Tereshchenko (ISKAN). Analyses of the Reagan Administration's activities in the military sphere usually focus on the colossal growth of arms expenditures. Deeper analyses, however, indicate that the current administration's direct role in the growth of American military spending is not as great as people are inclined to believe. Military programs approved earlier are responsible for much of the increase in arms appropriations. The current Republican administration was the first in the country's post-war history to begin revising the system of military-state economic management, and this constitutes its real contribution to the development of military production. At this time the main features of the new mechanism are just taking shape: This has entailed changes in the management of military contracts and pricing procedures for the purpose of reducing production costs, the intensification of competition in the distribution of contracts, etc. Nevertheless, the changes in the system of military-state economic management cannot compensate completely for the negative effects of the arms race in the U.S. economy.

In his report, A.M. Volkov stressed the need to consider economic factors in studies of the strategic balance at a time of radical reductions in strategic offensive arms. In the speaker's opinion, parity will depend largely on the elimination of elements of the "strategic triad" and on the subsequent use of the funds made available by this elimination. It is quite probable, for example, that these funds could be invested in the development of a new generation of conventional arms, particularly equipment for the automation of combat operations. The use of weapons of this kind could have an impact comparable to the use of nuclear weapons and they could have a serious destabilizing effect on the strategic balance.

In a discussion of the military-technical aspects of strategic stability, S.Yu. Tikhonov (ISKAN) analyzed one of the key issues of the strategic balance—the state of the strategic command, control, and communications system. Its improvement will play the most important role in the modernization of strategic arms and it is among the five top-priority military programs in the United States. The continued improvement of this system will establish the technical and moral basis for a transition

from "deterrence through intimidation" to "deterrence through preparedness," and this will contribute to the instability of strategic parity.

The stability of the strategic balance is one of the main conditions of international security. Another important aspect of this matter, international economic security, was also discussed at the conference.

A.V. Dyumulen pointed out the need for a new approach to the analysis of international economic security. In the speaker's opinion, the economic security of a country is now determined not by its isolation from other states but, on the contrary, by the degree of its integration in the world economy. Furthermore, the very concept of economic security in reference to a single country is relatively obsolete: Analyses of this concept must be based on a system of world economic coordinates.

One of the opinions expressed during the subsequent lively discussion was the idea that international economic security should now be examined from the standpoint of specific problems. This opinion was expressed by A.B. Manukovskiy (MGIMO) in his report on the international aspects of U.S. energy security. In his opinion, the development of contacts with reliable partners and a tougher U.S. position in relations with contracting partners will be the main external factors in the energy security of the American economy.

The idea of "dual leadership" of the world economy, a concept recently discussed in Western economic literature, was examined within the context of the issue of international security. Z.O. Kondratyeva (ISKAN) said that this was a matter of a new form of division of labor between the United States and Japan. The United States is expected to settle military and political conflicts while Japan is supposed to "solve" economic problems, including the problem of the debts of the developing countries. In the speaker's opinion, the actual possibility of this kind of alliance in the early 1990s seems quite dubious. It is more probable that these countries will coordinate some of their foreign economic actions in relations with emerging states.

International security will depend largely on the state of Soviet-American relations. In this context, A.Ya. Livshin (MGU) presented an interesting analysis of the main factors involved in the development of American Sovietological theories. Subsequent discussion led to the conclusion that the dynamics of the Soviet society's development have a much greater effect on the theories of Sovietologists than people assumed in the past. For example, the most reactionary bourgeois beliefs about real socialism took shape during the period of definite signs of stagnation in the USSR. Now we are witnessing the intensive revision of these "theories," although people with openly hostile feelings about the current changes in the USSR still occupy a prominent position in American Sovietology.

The conference demonstrated the potential of post-graduate American specialists to express interesting views on current U.S. economic and political issues. In view of the success of the conference, the ISKAN post-graduate council proposed the organization of annual conferences of this kind and encouraged all graduate students in American studies to submit their suggestions on this matter.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988

Political Views of U.S. Jews

18030010h Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 88 pp 120-127

[Letter to editors from reader L. Belousov (Leningrad) and response by D.Ye. Furman, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text]

Letter

I would like to know about the political views and opinions of American Jews. What is their social status? What are their views on matters of war and peace and what do they think of the U.S. Government's domestic and foreign policy, the situation in the Middle East, and the aggressive actions of the State of Israel?

Response

There are around 6 million Jews in the United States today, constituting approximately 2.7 percent of the total population. The overwhelming majority (more than 80 percent) are descended from immigrants who came to the United States in the late 19th century and early 20th from the "Jewish Pale" of the Russian Empire. Although some of the immigrants were people with quite definite political views, including Zionists, socialists (representing a variety of currents), and anarchists, most of them were ignorant of these matters because they had no opportunity to participate in public affairs or to acquire any kind of developed political consciousness in tsarist Russia. This consciousness took shape in them and in their descendants later. The overwhelming majority were Orthodox Jews, even if they were not deeply religious, and this is attested to by the subsequent rapid decline of Orthodox Judaism in the United States.

In the United States the social status, culture, and way of life of the Jewish immigrants changed radically. Although most of them were poor, could not speak the language, and had no knowledge of American customs, and although the conditions of their life were extremely hard in the beginning, they displayed great potential for social mobility (in this respect, only the Chinese and Japanese in America can be compared to them). The distinctive features of the culture of Jewish communities were the inclination toward petty bourgeois enterprise

and the characteristic Jewish love of knowledge and scholarship, which easily made the transition from veneration of the Talmud to a thirst for scientific knowledge during the process of secularization. The immigrants also retained the oppressed minority's characteristic feelings of solidarity, feelings which had been turned into an instinct by centuries of experience. These were people who were suddenly presented with a choice of different roads to take and different ways of achieving social success, and many were able to do so.

Their mobility was accomplished through two main channels—through bourgeois enterprise and, to an even greater extent, through education for a career in the intellectual professions. Several works in American literature tell how a Jewish family economizes on everything for the sake of the son's education.

By the 1940s the Jews already constituted the richest and most highly educated of the large religious-ethnic groups in the United States. According to a study conducted in 1945 and 1946, 63.1 percent of the Jews in America had a secondary or higher education (as compared to 48.1 percent for the population at large), and 36.1 percent were businessmen or professionals (19 percent for the population at large).¹ In 1970, although the national level of education had risen, the difference was even more perceptible: 41.1 percent of the Jewish males had at least 16 years of education, but the figure for all white males in the country was 14.3 percent. The corresponding figures for women were 24.2 and 8.5 percent.² And although the Jews represented, as mentioned above, only around 2.7 percent of the population of the United States in the 1970s, approximately 20 percent of the millionaires in America were members of this group.

It is understandable that this kind of "social ascent" became possible only after considerable acculturation—the increasing use of the English language and the gradual abandonment of Yiddish, the adoption of an American lifestyle, and the renunciation of Orthodox Judaism. Today no more than 10 percent of the Jews in America are Orthodox. Most of them belong to the modernist, non-Orthodox currents—the so-called Reform and Conservative currents. Furthermore, the Jews are the least religious of the three main religious communities in the United States—Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish. In 1980, for example, 39 percent of the Protestants, 53 percent of the Catholics, and 25 percent of the Jews went to a church or synagogue once a week, and the respective numbers of those saying that religion was "not very important" in their lives were 8, 9, and 32 percent.³

Anti-Semitism was particularly strong in the United States in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, during the main period of the Jewish community's social rise, which aroused the natural fear and envy of rivals. Even then, however, anti-Semitism could not impede the social mobility of Jews. Today it is not as strong, and this is confirmed by numerous polls and studies. Whereas 58

percent agreed with the statement that "Jews have too much power" in 1946, only 8 percent agreed in 1981;⁴ 46 percent said that they "might vote for a Jewish presidential candidate" in 1937, but the figure was 82 percent in 1982.⁵

This indicates that the Jews in the United States today represent a religious-ethnic group which has essentially become an integral part of American society. Furthermore, there are more members of the intelligentsia and bourgeoisie in this group than in others. We could assume that the political views of American Jews would not differ from the views of other Americans of the same social status. It would be natural to expect their view of the world to include a substantial portion of social conservatism and the idealization of the conditions in which they "rose to the top," which could be combined with the liberal views in the sphere of culture and morality that are characteristic of the educated part of the population. But this is not the case. The sociopolitical views of Jews in the United States are quite unique.

The social views of the American Jewish community cannot be judged by the views of its individual members. The only method of discerning the views of a large group consists in analyzing public opinion polls and other information about the mass consciousness and behavior of the group.

Let us start with the most superficial level of the political outlook—the self-identification of respondents as liberals or conservatives. According to the combined results of polls conducted from 1972 to 1977, 52 percent of the Jews defined themselves as liberals and 13 percent called themselves conservatives. The respective figures for white Christians were 25 percent and 33 percent, and those for blacks were 43 percent and 23 percent. The term "liberalism" is extremely vague in the United States and covers both a positive attitude toward the redistribution of income in favor of the poor with the aid of government regulation (it is indicative that in this respect "liberalism" prevails among blacks) and tolerance for cultural and ideological differences, especially those connected with education and intelligence. The higher educational level of Jews might be used as an explanation for their greater inclination to regard themselves as liberals, but this is not the case. The percentage of liberals is slightly higher among Christian and Jewish college graduates than among those without a higher education, but differences between Jews and other college graduates still exist, and they are appreciable differences. They are also appreciable when another factor, the regional factor, is taken into account: If educated Jews are compared to educated Christians living in the northeast and on the Pacific coast, where most of the Jewish population is concentrated, we can categorize the first group as 61 percent liberal and 7 percent conservative and the second group as 37 percent liberal and 35 percent conservative.⁶

Now let us look at the Jewish community's position on specific sociopolitical issues. In 1956 the members of the "middle class" who agreed with the statement that

"children of workers have good opportunities for advancement in the United States" included 73 percent of the white Protestants, 61 percent of the Catholics, and only 59 percent of the Jews.⁷ The "middle class" Jews were even less likely to agree with this statement than white Protestant workers (62 percent).

In 1964, 36 percent of the white Protestants, 30 percent of the Catholics, 19 percent of the Jews, and 8 percent of the blacks agreed with the statement that "poverty is usually the result of a lack of effort on the part of the poor person"; the respective figures agreeing with the statement that "poverty is usually due to circumstances beyond the individual's control" were 27, 34, 37, and 39 percent.⁸ Government guarantees against unemployment and poverty were supported by 55 percent of the Jews, 23 percent of the white Protestants, and 33 percent of the Catholics in 1968. Finally, 53 percent of the Christians and 40 percent of the Jews agreed with the statement that "communism is the worst form of government" in the 1970s.

It is certainly no coincidence that Jews have been so active in the Communist Party, USA, or that this small party publishes a special newspaper printed partly in English and partly in Yiddish, JEWISH AFFAIRS, for its members and sympathizers.

All polls imparting attitudes toward blacks and racism indicate that the Jews sympathize more with the blacks' struggle for equality. For example, 33 percent of the Catholics, 27 percent of the Protestants, and 8 percent of the Jews supported the white southerners wanting segregation (racial barriers) in 1956. These days are long gone, and racism is weak today, but even in the 1970s laws prohibiting interracial marriages were condemned by 91 percent of the Christians and 96 percent of the Jews with a higher education living in the northeast or on the west coast, and the respective figures disagreeing with laws giving homeowners the right to refuse to sell homes to buyers on the basis of skin color were 48 percent and 52 percent. The antiracist, "pro-negro" position of American Jews, which remained strong in the 1980s in spite of the signs of anti-Zionism (and even anti-Semitism) among blacks, was clearly revealed in the elections of black mayors in American cities. The black candidate in Chicago, H. Washington, was supported by 18 percent of all whites and 35 percent of the Jews (even though his opponent was Jewish), black candidate W. Goode in the Philadelphia primary won 23 percent of the white vote and 50 percent of the Jewish vote, and in Los Angeles T. Bradley was supported by 42 percent of all the whites and 75 percent of the Jews.⁹

Jews are more tolerant than Christians of atheists and socialists. In 1954 the people with a higher education who supported the right of atheists to speak publicly included 91 percent of the Jews and 60 percent of the white Christians polled, with respective figures of 92 percent and 83 percent in the 1970s; 97 percent of the Jews and 80 percent of the white Christians supported

the right of socialists to make public speeches in 1954, and 98 percent and 89 percent supported this right in the 1970s; 93 percent of the Jews and 74 percent of the Christians believed that socialist books should be kept in public libraries in 1954, and the respective figures in the 1970's were 95 percent and 86 percent.¹⁰

Numerous polls also indicate the Jewish community's greater tolerance in matters of morality and sympathy for women seeking equal rights; in the 1970s abortion rights were supported by 97 percent of the Jews and 66 percent of the Christians with a higher education in the northeast and on the west coast. In 1981, 93 percent of the Jews, 79 percent of the Catholics, and 78 percent of the Protestants approved of the appointment of a woman, Sandra O'Connor, to the Supreme Court.¹¹

There is always a connection between views on domestic and foreign policy issues, and it is apparent in this case as well. If we disregard the special sphere of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which we will be discussing later, we can clearly see the same tendencies in the American Jews' attitude toward foreign policy as in their approach to domestic political problems. In the two polls we know of which were separated by a fairly lengthy period, there were more opponents and fewer supporters of military spending increases among Jews than among Christians: 61 percent of the Protestants, 72 percent of the Catholics, and 56 percent of the Jews were in favor of increased military spending in 1950, and in the 1970s the growth of this spending was opposed by 56 percent of the Jews and 29 percent of the white Christians.

In all military conflicts the percentage of Jews in favor of their peaceful settlement is higher than the national

average. In 1952 the continuation of the war in Korea to the point of victory was supported by 39 percent of the white Protestants, 40 percent of the Catholics, and 25 percent of the Jews, and the respective figures in favor of Korean peace talks were 28, 30, and 54 percent. In 1961 U.S. armed intervention in the affairs of the Dominican Republic was approved by 51, 57, and 44 percent. In 1964 stronger "U.S. military pressure on Vietnam" was advocated by 23, 15, and 2 percent; in 1965, when respondents were asked to choose between the escalation of hostilities and withdrawal from Vietnam, 32 percent, 32 percent and 41 percent chose withdrawal; in 1966, 24 percent, 26 percent and 39 percent called themselves "doves" and 48, 45, and 22 percent called themselves "hawks"; in 1973 amnesty for those who dodged the draft during the Vietnam War was supported by 34, 51, and 61 percent.

In domestic policy matters the Jews are inclined to agree with the idea of the redistribution of income in favor of the poor with the aid of government regulation. Something similar to this can be seen in the foreign policy sphere, where they approve of economic aid to underdeveloped countries (which could be called the poor on the international level). In 1956 the respondents expressing complete agreement with the statement that the United States should help the poor countries even if they cannot repay the debt represented 21 percent, 21 percent, and 30 percent (of the previously listed communities); in 1957 aid to countries which were not allies of the United States, such as India, was supported by 38, 43, and 69 percent; in 1961 the belief that the United States was not doing enough to assist underdeveloped countries was expressed by 13, 16, and 42 percent; and in 1963 aid to foreign states was supported by 57, 61, and 70 percent.

Years	Statements	% agreeing with statement or answering yes		
		Protestants (white)	Catholics	Jews
1943	When the war is over Russia can be trusted in postwar cooperation	47	39	82
1948	The United States should be more uncompromising in relations with the USSR	63	65	43
1950	Stopping communism is America's most important job	80	93	62
1960	The West can live in peace with the Russians	33	44	60
1964	We can reach agreements with the Russians	54	61	67
1965	The West can live in peace with the Russians	37	42	62
1974	Full-scale diplomatic relations should be established with Cuba	59*		87
	The United States will be threatened by communism in:			
	—Western Europe	82*		62
	—Italy	61*		40
	—Japan	78*		53
	—Latin America	80*		51
1980	The United States should act tougher in relations with the USSR	54*		46
	Disagree with the last statement	31*		41

* Two groups combined.

Source: Gallup and Harris polls.

The tendency of the American Jewish community to be more friendly than the "average American" toward the USSR and the socialist countries has been revealed regularly in numerous polls over many years. Many data attest to this, and we have summarized some of them (see table). (This does not exclude the rabid anti-Sovietism of some members of the Jewish community in the United States, like some of the high-level officials in Reagan's first administration—for example, R. Pipes or R. Perle.)

Using the data in the table, we can compare the views of only Protestants, Catholics, and Jews as a whole, but we could also cite the results of polls in which education, age, and the regional factor are taken into account. For example, among instructors under the age of 30 in elite colleges, 28 percent of the Protestants, 30 percent of the Catholics, and 43 percent of the Jews were opposed to the Vietnam War at the end of the 1960s, while the respective figures for instructors in other colleges were 20, 20, and 39 percent.¹² In the 1970s, 67 percent of the Jews and 53 percent of the Christians with a higher education in the northeast and on the west coast believed that the United States was spending too much on defense.

The results of these polls are indirectly confirmed by data on voting behavior. The overwhelming majority of Jews vote for Democratic candidates. In the 1980 presidential election the votes of members of the three main American religions were distributed among candidates in the following manner: 63 percent of the white Protestants, 49 percent of the Catholics, and 39 percent of the Jews voted for Reagan, 31 percent, 42 percent, and 45 percent voted for Carter, and 6, 7, and 15 percent voted for independent candidate J. Anderson. In 1984 Reagan won the votes of 73 percent of the white Protestants, 55 percent of the Catholics, and 32 percent of the Jews, and Mondale was supported by 26, 44, and 66 percent. Jews and blacks were the only ethnic groups to vote for Reagan in smaller numbers in 1984 than in 1980. Therefore, there are clear indications of liberal, "leftist" tendencies in the political thinking of American Jews.

In addition, however, there is another important aspect of the American Jews' view of the world which conflicts sharply with their liberal outlook—their ethnocentrism and their strong instinct for self-preservation as a separate community, which can easily turn into nationalism.

In G. Lenski's famous study of religious communities (1956), to which we have already referred, the exclusivity of Jews and their intolerance in their personal life and daily affairs were revealed. According to Lenski's data, all of the closest relatives of 96 percent of the Jews and all of the close friends of 77 percent were Jewish (the respective figures for the larger and less cultured Catholic group were 79 percent and 44 percent). In spite of their relatively weak religious beliefs, 96 percent of the Jews said that their relatives would be unhappy if they

were to convert to another faith (for the sake of comparison, 87 percent of the Catholics and 75 percent of the white Protestants also said this).

This creates the impression that the Jewish community in the United States has two seemingly unrelated sets of principles. One applies to the society at large and the other is the set of principles governing the Jews' feelings about themselves and their own religious-ethnic group. This kind of "double standard" is apparent in literally every sphere.

Criticism of the society of free enterprise is combined with the acceptance of its standards and the goal of success in this society. According to Lenski's data, 96 percent of the Jews, 85 percent of the Catholics, and 83 percent of the white Protestants had savings accounts. This goal of personal success in the capitalist society is simultaneously a belief in the future success of the society as a whole.

The double standard is displayed in extremely curious forms in matters of morality. During Lenski's study, respondents were asked whether they considered divorce to be bad under any circumstances whatsoever and whether they would get a divorce themselves. The responses were interesting: 11 percent of the Jews, 66 percent of the Catholics, 34 percent of the white Protestants, and 38 percent of the blacks felt that divorce was "bad under any circumstances." In fact, however, 4 percent of the Jews, 8 percent of the Catholics, 16 percent of the white Protestants, and 22 percent of the blacks were divorced. Therefore, although the Jews expressed opinions contrary to traditional morality, they were actually observing these standards and adhering to traditional moral principles, which is fully in line with their emphasis on the cohesion and exclusivity of their community and on social success (this is in direct contrast to the behavior of blacks, who profess a belief in stricter morals but do not adhere to these morals themselves).

It is probable, however, that the "double standard" in the outlook of American Jews is reflected most distinctly in their attitude toward Zionism and the State of Israel. Zionism prevailed in the Jewish community in the 1940's. Whereas in 1944, prior to the establishment of Israel, 69 percent of the Jews in the United States were in favor of "Zionism and the creation of a Jewish state" and 7 percent were opposed to this, 92 percent of the Jews were on Israel's side at the time of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 and almost no one was on the side of the Arabs. When the creation of the State of Israel was only in the planning stage, there were opponents to the plan, but these opponents disappeared when it became a reality.

Their deeply ingrained ethnocentrism came into play and the "double standard" prevailed in all spheres: One set of criteria applied to Israel and another set applied to the rest of the world. Nationalism was bad, but Zionism

was good. In the opinion of most American Jews, Zionism was not a form of nationalism, but, in the words of A. Silver, renowned spokesman for American Zionism, "the normal and natural instinct of a homeless people to acquire their own home after centuries of living without one."¹³ Aggression was bad, but Israeli aggression was defensive rather than aggressive. National liberation movements warranted support, but the movement of the Palestinians was terrorism and not a liberation movement.

Whatever Israel did, it continued to be viewed by most American Jews as a small democratic state surrounded by hungry giants. Any criticism of Israel was interpreted as a sign of latent anti-Semitism. It was only recently that signs of a more critical attitude toward Israel became evident in the U.S. Jewish community.

It would be difficult to accuse the American mass media, in which Jews play an extremely important role, and government agencies of anti- Israeli sentiments. The average American, therefore, acquires information from pro-Israeli sources and his attitude toward Israel could never be called unfriendly. Nevertheless, the ways in which Jews and other Americans view the actions of this state reveal quite pronounced differences. In 1953, for example, 9 percent of the white Protestants, 9 percent of the Catholics, and 67 percent of the Jews felt that the Arabs were mostly to blame for the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1957, 38 percent of the Catholics, 41 percent of the Protestants, and 83 percent of the Jews believed that Egypt was to blame for Israel's war with Egypt, and 15, 11, and 2 percent believed that Israel was to blame.¹⁴ In February 1979 Israel was blamed by 10 percent of the Jews and 37 percent of the American population as a whole for the impasse in the Israeli-Egyptian talks, and Egypt was blamed by 77 percent of the Jews and 30 percent of the entire population.¹⁵ In 1982, 8 percent of the total population and 28 percent of the Jews felt that Israel was not to blame for the massacre in Sabra and Shatila. In 1988, 10 percent of the Jews and 45 percent of the non-Jews believed that aid to Israel should be cut off because of its actions against the Palestinians.¹⁶ This list of polling data could be continued and the results would remain the same.

What is the reason for this peculiar view of the world, combining strong liberal tendencies with equally strong ethnocentric and nationalistic feelings?

Above all, as a religious-ethnic minority, the Jewish community, just as any other minority, is still afraid of intolerance and persecution by the majority, and this is the main reason for the liberal tendencies. Ethnocentrism is not a unique attribute of this community either; it is characteristic of the Greeks, the Armenians, the Chinese, and other minorities in the United States.

The distinctive features of Judaism as a religion are also responsible to some extent for the political views of American Jews. According to Judaism, the truth is

known to only one people, God's chosen people. This idea became part of the thinking of many generations for centuries and has now become an almost unconscious belief. It is present even in the subconscious mind of the non-religious (or semi-religious) Jew, just as remnants of Confucianism are still present in the mind of today's Chinese non-believer, Hinduism is present in the Indian mind, and the individualism and work ethic of his Puritan ancestors is present in the mind of the "average" white American. Contemporary Jewish ethnocentrism in the United States is in many respects a "remnant" of the idea that the Jews are God's chosen people, an idea which has become an unconscious belief that can cause a completely liberal person to be horrified by the prospect of his daughter's marriage to a non-Jew or to "instinctively" support any actions by the State of Israel. By the same token, the Jews' liberal and even "socialistic" beliefs are in many respects a "remnant" of the earlier belief in a future kingdom of justice on earth in which the lion would lie down with the lamb.

But if this is the case, if the mass political consciousness of the community is influenced by "remnants" of Judaism, by its inertia, so to speak, these peculiarities of the mass consciousness should disappear as a result of secularization and assimilation. And this is happening, although it is an extremely slow process. The religious-ethnic factor is gradually losing its strength, and the views of the Jewish community and of certain social groups in the rest of the population are converging. Furthermore, we can clearly see three separate elements in this process.

First of all, the difference in views on some matters is becoming less pronounced because nationwide views are gradually becoming more liberal in many spheres. These are views on racial, religious, and ideological minorities, on women's rights, and on government intervention in matters of morality. The convergence of views in these areas is revealed clearly in the data cited in the beginning of this article on attitudes toward atheists and socialists.

Second, views are converging as a result of the Jewish community's "rightward shift" in socioeconomic matters. The polling data confirming this tendency are few in number and are debatable,¹⁷ but a rightward shift, even if only an extremely slow one, is nevertheless apparent to us if we recall the pre-war traditions of Jewish leftist radicalism, traditions which have now virtually disappeared. The percentage of Jews defining themselves as Democrats is declining perceptibly, and the percentage calling themselves independents or identifying to some degree with the Republican Party is rising. In 1976, 65 percent of the Jews voted for J. Carter and 35 percent voted for G. Ford. In the 1980 election Reagan won 39 percent of the Jewish vote, Carter won 45 percent, and Anderson won 15 percent. The 39 percent who voted for Reagan certainly cannot be called a small group. Although Jews gave Reagan less support than before in

the 1984 election, this could have been a temporary departure, a reaction to Reagan's particularly strong conservatism, from a general rightward shift.

Finally, the third sign of this process in the Jewish community is the gradual decline of ethnocentrism. This is seen most clearly in statistics on mixed marriages, reflecting the deepest psychological and personal level of ethnic feelings. The exclusivity of the Jewish community existed for a long time, but assimilation is stronger than all of the conscious and unconscious barriers erected in its path. According to a 1973 study, 9.2 percent of all married Jews had non-Jewish partners. This was true of 2 percent of the people who got married between 1900 and 1920, 6 percent of those who married between 1940 and 1960, 17 percent of those who married between 1960 and 1965, and 32 percent of those who married between 1965 and 1970.¹⁸ The strong Jewish families described in Lenski's study, families concerned mainly with the social success of the next generation, are largely a thing of the past. The divorce rate is rising, the birthrate has declined enough to reduce the size of the community, and it is no longer uncommon to see the once extremely rare sight of a young Jew who has dropped out of school or college and has become part of the "counterculture," with its drugs, Eastern cults, and "free love." All of these are different aspects of the processes of assimilation and the disappearance of the purely "instinctive" cohesion and exclusivity that lay the psychological foundation for various ideological displays of ethnocentrism and, above all, Zionism.

All of this has been accompanied by the appearance of cultural and psychological barriers separating American Jews from the Jews in Israel. When two waves of Jewish emigration left Eastern Europe in the beginning of the 20th century, with the larger wave settling in the United States and the smaller one in Zionist settlements in Palestine, these were people with a common culture, and sometimes they were even brothers, in the most direct sense of the word rather than the metaphorical sense. As the years went by and new generations took the place of older ones, the American Jews became part of the American nationality and the Jews in Israel formed a different nationality, speaking a different language, living under different conditions, and building a different culture. An increasingly perceptible role in this nationality began to be played by immigrants from Arab countries who were culturally quite distant from the American Jews. Here are some data on mixed marriages between European Jews and Jews from Arab countries in Israel: 11.8 percent of all marriages in 1955, 14.5 percent in 1960, 17 percent in 1970, and 19.1 percent in 1974.¹⁹ These data and the information about the marriages of Jews and non-Jews in the United States clearly indicate the separation of the two Jewish communities.

Separation inevitably leads to the growth of mutual misunderstandings and conflicts. American Jews are increasingly likely to disagree with customs in Israel, the entire way of life there, and its foreign policy. This

process is discussed in the book "Religiya i politika v SShA v 70-ye nachale 80-kh godov."²⁰ The more distinct critical attitudes toward Israel can even be seen in the polling data cited above. There is no question that the views of Jews and the rest of the population in the United States on Israel diverged more in the 1950s than in the 1980s. In 1982 separate surveys of Jews and the leaders of Jewish organizations revealed a highly critical attitude toward Israel (it is interesting that the leaders were even more likely to criticize Israel than the Jewish population at large). For example, 28 percent of all the Jews and 74 percent of the Jewish leaders agreed with the statement that Israel's continued occupation of the West Bank would cause the "erosion of the democratic bases of Israeli society," 25 percent and 22 percent of the same two groups agreed that "Israel's adherence to democratic values has shown signs of erosion in recent years," and 48 percent and 70 percent said they were frequently disturbed by the policies of the current Israeli Government.²¹

It must be said, however, that this general process of "distancing" from Israel (which a new flare-up of the Middle East conflict could replace with a stronger sense of solidarity) could be accompanied by hysterical ultra-Zionist emotions in the most nationalistic segments of the American Jewish community.

Paradoxically, it is the American community that supplies Israel with its extremists. Although American Zionism was always confined to aid to Israel and never led to any sizable wave of emigration, in the 1970s and 1980s some ultra-Zionists emigrated from the United States to Israel; and one was the notorious Meir Kahane. Now immigrants from the United States represent around 10 percent of the population of the settlements on the West Bank (although the percentage of people from the United States in Israel as a whole is absolutely negligible). Incidentally, the quite small but highly active extremist Jewish Defense League is showing signs of life again in the United States.

Therefore, the gradual disappearance of ethnic exclusivity could lead to outbursts of extremism in the minority resisting this process. Even if this minority should attract some attention, its activity will nevertheless represent only a futile attempt to stop natural and irreversible processes.

We have attempted to reveal the distinctive features of the mass political consciousness of the American Jews and the general tendency toward a gradual increase in the role of nationwide factors and decrease in the role of factors characteristic of this religious-ethnic group in this consciousness. We must say, however, that this does not mean that the differences in the views of Jews and other Americans will disappear completely within the foreseeable future. Although the decline of the religious-ethnic factor's importance is an irreversible process, it is similar to a numerical progression in which the number decreases but never reaches zero.

Just as there are still some differences—however infinitesimal—today in the political views of American Baptists and Catholics, Methodists and Episcopalians, the political thinking of the Jewish community obviously still has its own specific features, but in time they will be nothing more than almost indiscernible nuances.

Footnotes

1. W. Herberg, "Protestant, Catholic, Jew. An Essay in American Religious Sociology," New York, 1956, pp 241, 230.
2. "Jewish Life in the United States: Perspectives from the Social Sciences," edited by J. Gitter, New York, 1981, p 82.
3. "Religion in America: 1981 Gallup Opinion Index," Princeton (N.J.), 1981, pp 32-40.
4. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 13 July 1981, p 49.
5. "The Gallup Poll Release," 16 April 1981.
6. "Jewish Life in the United States," p 154.
7. G. Lenski, "The Religious Factor," Garden City (Mich.), 1961, p 93.
8. A. Hero, "American Religious Groups View Foreign Policy. Trends in Rank-and-File Opinion, 1937-1969," Durham (N.H.), 1973, p 467.
9. S. Stern, "Blacks and Jews Forging a Renewed Alliance?" VILLAGE VOICE, 25 October 1983, pp 8-36.
10. "Jewish Life in the United States," p 168.
11. THE HARRIS SURVEY, 20 July 1981.
12. A. Greeley, "The Religious Factor and Academic Careers," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 1973, vol 78, No 5, p 1250.
13. "The Zionist Idea," edited by A. Herberg, New York, 1962, p 596.
14. A. Hero, Op. cit., pp 360, 362.
15. THE HARRIS SURVEY, 11 January 1979.
16. TIME, 8 February 1988, p 40.
17. W. Nie, S. Verba, and J. Petrocik, "The Changing American Voter," Cambridge (Mass.), 1976, p 258.
18. "Jewish Life in the United States," p 54.

19. S. Smootha, "Israel: Pluralism and Conflict," Berkeley (Calif.), 1978, p 345.

20. "Religiya i politika v SShA v 70-ye-nachale 80-kh godov" [Religion and Politics in the United States in the 1970's and Early 1980's], edited by Yu.A. Zamoshkin and D.Ye. Furman, Moscow, 1984.

21. VILLAGE VOICE, 25 October 1983, pp 8-9.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988

Articles Not Translated from SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 6, June 1988

18030010i Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 88 pp 1-2

Production and Consumer Service Franchises (I.I. Razumnova) pp 25-34

Health Service in Canada (L.A. Nemova and Ye.Ye. Starostenkova) pp 35-44

American Schools: Problems, Difficulties, and the Search for Solutions (I.Ye. Korzheva) pp 60-63

America's Great Entrepreneurial Surge: An Analysis (John R. Stuteville) pp 71-75

Air Quality Management in the United States (I.V. Petryanov-Sokolov and A.G. Sutugin) pp 76-83

Review of "The 1988 Defense Budget" by Joshua Epstein (N.M. Travkina) pp 87-89

Review of "Outward Bound: Canadian Direct Investment in the United States" by Alan M. Rugman (L.A. Bagramov) pp 89-92

Review of "U.S.-Soviet Cultural Exchanges, 1958-1986. Who Wins?" by Yale Richmond (I.Ya. Kobrinskaya) . pp 92-95

Review of "The Other Side. How Soviets and Americans Perceive Each Other" by Robert English and Jonathan Halperin (O.A. Alyakrinskiy) pp 95-98

Review of "Lobbyists in the United States" and of "Dollar Diplomacy (Foreign Policy Lobbyists in the United States," both by Stefan Nikolov (V.P. Barannikov and I.Ye. Zadorozhnyuk) pp 98-100

Ohio (L.V. Smirnyagin) pp 101-108

Demographic Processes and the Economy (Ye.D. Mikhaylov) pp 109- 115

Publication Data

18030010j Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA,
IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 88

English title: USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOL-
OGY

Russian title: SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA,
IDEOLOGIYA

Editor: V.M. Berezhkov

Publishing house: Izdatelstvo "Nauka"

Place of publication: Moscow

Date of publication: June 1988

Signed to press: 25 May 1988

Copies: 28,500

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekono-
mika, politika, ideologiya", 1988

22161

110

NTIS

ATTN: PROCESS 103

BEVERLY FARRADAY

5285 PORT ROYAL RD

SPRINGFIELD, VA

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed, with personal and place names rendered in accordance with FBIS transliteration style.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.